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I. INTRODUCTION

INmously
EARLY 1996, the United States Supreme Court unaniheld in Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co. that the Death
on the High Seas Act ("DOHSA") provided the substantive
United States law when an airplane crashes on the high seas.'
The basic effect of this ruling reaffirmed earlier precedent holding that the recovery in DOHSA cases was limited to the pecuniary damages provided in DOHSA.2 The Zicherman Court's
ruling thereby restated the historical understanding that
DOHSA prevents the recovery of nonpecuniary damages-i.e.,
"loss of society" damages-from defendants named in cases arising out of high seas aviation accidents:
In early 2000, Zicherman was legislatively eviscerated by the enactment of Public Law 106-181, an aviation appropriations bill
containing a proviso, section 404, which amended DOHSA. 4
Section 404(a) of Public Law 106-181 prevents DOHSA from applying to commercial aviation accidents occurring on the high
seas twelve nautical miles or closer to the shore of any State or
Territory of the United States. While subsection (a) of section
404 represented a drastic departure from case law addressing
DOHSA's application to high seas aviation accidents, the Congress did not stop there. Additionally, passage of section 404(b)
of Public Law 106-181 allows recovery of nonpecuniary damages
I See Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 231 (1996). To reach
this holding, the Zicherman Court determined that Articles 17 and 24(2) of the
Warsaw Convention, which governed the case and allowed for recovery of only
legally cognizable harm, left the specification of what damages are recoverable to
the applicable domestic law under the forum's choice-of-law rules. See id. at 229;
see also Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Carriage by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 127 L.N.T.s. 11, reprinted in49 U.S.C. 40105 (1995)
[hereinafter Warsaw Convention].
2 See Zicherman, 516 U.S. at 231.
For a discussion of DOHSA's specific provisions as they read prior to April 5, 2000, see infra Part II.A. Damages are "pecuniary" when they relate to money or can be valued in money. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1152 (Bryan A. Garner ed. 7th ed. 1999).
3 See Zicherman, 516 U.S. at 231. Other nonpecuniary damages include damages for grief and bereavement, anxiety, distress, and mental pain and suffering.
See Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 587 n.17 (1974). Punitive damages are also nonpecuniary in nature. See id.
4 See infra Part IV.A.
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arising from commercial aviation accidents occurring beyond
the twelve nautical mile threshold.
Even before passage of section 404 of Public Law 106-181,
DOHSA's applicability to high seas aviation accidents had come
under attack when the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York ("SDNY") held that DOHSA did
not apply to the ongoing litigation surrounding the crash of
Trans World Airlines ("TWA") Flight 800. 5 Just before publication of this article, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed the SDNY's ruling, with one of the
three circuit judges dissenting.' As will be discussed below, enactment of section 404 of Public Law 106-181 is an express approval of the SDNY's and the Second Circuit's unprecedented
rulings in the TWA Flight 800 case. In essence, by enacting section 404 of Public Law 106-181, Congress has recreated the
problem that DOHSA was designed to remedy: inconsistent recovery of damages arising from deaths occurring on the high
seas.
This Article focuses on the legislative and judicial efforts to
erode DOHSA's application to high seas aviation accidents.
Specifically, the legal and social desirability of such erosion will
be discussed. When one examines the effect of Public Law 106181's amendment of DOHSA through section 404, certain aspects of the amended provisions reveal themselves as unworkable and out of sync with the uniformity principle of Federal
maritime law; moreover, where the Second Circuit's opinion
provides guidance in the interpretation of the amended
DOHSA provisions, similar legal and public policy problems are
encountered. This Article highlights these legal and social
shortcomings.
Part II of this Article outlines the provisions of DOHSA as
they existed prior to enactment of Public Law 106-181. Part III
focuses on the ongoing TWA Flight 800 litigation and criticizes
the SDNY's ruling in In re Air Crash off Long Island, New York, on
July 17, 1996 and the Second Circuit's affirming decision. Part
IV addresses the practical effect of Public Law 106-181's amendment of DOHSA through section 404. Finally, Part V examines
existing and future litigation arising from recent high seas commercial airline accidents, considering both the impact of Public
Law 106-181's amendment of DOHSA through section 404, as
5
6

See infra Part III.C.
See infra Part III.D.
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well as the decisions in In re Air Crash off Long Island, New York,

where applicable.
II.
A.

DOHSA

THE STATUTE

This Article demonstrates that, historically, DOHSA's application to aviation accidents occurring over open waters has been
the subject of controversy. Much of this controversy surrounded
46 U.S.C. § 761, which, before enactment of Public Law 106-181,
read:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act,
neglect, or default occurringon the high seas beyond a marine league
from the shore of any State, or the District of Columbia, or the Terri-

tories or dependencies of the United States, the personal representative of the decedent may maintain a suit for damages in the
district courts of the United States, in admiralty, for the exclusive
benefit of the decedent's wife, husband, parent, child, or dependent relative against the vessel, person, or corporation which
would have been liable if death had not ensued.7
Other DOHSA provisions relevant to high seas aviation accidents include 46 U.S.C. §§ 762, 764, and 767. Before enactment
of section 404 of Public Law 106-181, § 762 provided that recovery in a section 761 lawsuit "shall be a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary loss [only] sustained by the persons for
whose benefit the suit is brought...

."I'

Section 764, a provision

unaltered by section 404, allows maintenance of a lawsuit in admiralty in Federal courts for deaths occurring on the high seas
whenever a right of action is granted by a foreign law.' The provision permits damages awards without a reduction of the recovery amount." Section 767, also unaltered by section 404 of
7 46 U.S.C. app. § 761 (1994) (emphasis added).
8 Id. § 762 (emphasis added).
9 See 46 U.S.C. app. § 764 (1994) (emphasis added). Section 764 provides:
Whenever a right of action is granted by the law of any foreign
State on account of death by wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring upon the high seas, such right may be maintained in an
appropriate action in admiralty in the courts of the United States
without abatement in respect to the amount for which recovery is
authorized, any statute of the United States to the contrary
notwithstanding.
Id.
10 See id. Case law has given § 764 various interpretations. See Dooley v. Korean
Air Lines Co., 117 F.3d 1477, 1483 (D.C. Cir. 1997), affJd, 524 U.S. 116 (1998).
Some cases have allowed plaintiffs to use an action under DOHSA and § 764 to
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Public Law 106-181, provides that the provisions of any state statute regulating rights of action or remedies for wrongful death
will not be affected by the enactment of DOHSA."
B.

LEGISLATIvE HISTORY

The United States Constitution impliedly empowers Congress
to revise and supplement the maritime law within constitutional
limits.' 2 Despite this implied power, Congress has rarely con-

fronted the issue of maritime tort jurisdiction.' One notable
exception is DOHSA. In the years leading up to DOHSA's enactment, the Maritime Law Association and various admiralty
scholars had been attempting to pass a bill that would provide
for an admiralty right of action for deaths occurring on the high
seas.' 4 The advantages of such a bill, according to these scholars, would be to provide these remedies on the high seas, where
such remedies did not exist because the high seas were outside
of the territorial limits and jurisdiction of the individual states.' 5
Certain members of the judiciary also supported enactment of
such a bill, citing the need for a uniform federal law to correct
the injustices
arising from the non-uniform nature of state
6
remedies. '

assert claims recognized under both United States and foreign law. See id. (citations omitted). Other courts have viewed §§ 761 and 764 to be mutually excilsive, thereby preventing plaintiffs from recovering under both foreign law and
DOHSA. See id. (citations omitted). For a more in-depth discussion of the application of § 764 to commercial airline accidents, see infra note 229 and accompanying text.
11 See 46 U.S.C. app. § 767 (1994). Section 767 also expressly provides that
DOHSA will not apply to the Great Lakes, the Panama Canal Zone, or to any
waters within the territorial limits of any State. See id.
12 See THOMASJ. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAw 56-57 (1987) (citing Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 360-61
(1959)).
13 See id. at 235.
1 See 52 CONG. REC. 284 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1914) (quotingJan. 26, 1914, letter
from C.E. Kremer to Hon. James R. Mann).
15 See id.
16 See id. at 284-85 (quoting Aug. 22, 1913, letter from Judge Harrington Putnam to Hon. E.Y. Webb). Focusing on this non-uniformity, judge Putnam's letter
provided:
In some States, the recovery is limited to the conscious pain and
suffering before death-a matter difficult of proof in case of
drowning at sea. . . . Other States only give the remedy against
those who are common carriers, which would not apply to vessels
chartered or engaged for a single owner ....
Such State statutes,
diverse in their terms and conflicting in remedies, are but a poor
makeshift for the uniform, simple legislation which Congress alone
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TRANS WORLD AIRLINES FLIGHT 800 LITIGATION
A.

INTRODUCTION

As will be further discussed below, the SDNY's decision and
the Second Circuit's ruling in In re Air Crash off Long Island, New
York, has been codified by enactment of section 404 of Public
Law 106-181. This Article argues that the SDNY's decision and
its appellate approval, along with its codification in section 404,
will only bring confusion to the litigation of aviation accidents
occurring on the high seas. To understand the level of confusion brought about by enactment of section 404 of Public Law
106-181, it is important to examine the background of its case
law counterparts: the SDNY's and the Second Circuit's decisions
in In re Air Crash Off Long Island, New York.
B.

BACKGROUND

On July 17, 1996, approximately eight nautical miles off the
coast of Long Island, New York, Paris-bound TWA Flight 800
exploded and crashed shortly after takeoff from John F. Ken7
nedy International Airport, killing all 230 people aboard.'
While the NTSB has not released its final report, the agency theorizes that the explosion resulted from the ignition of volatile
Jet A fuel vapors in the Boeing 747's center-wing fuel tank.'"
C.

MOTION TO DISMISS NONPECUNIARY DAMAGES-

SDNY's

DECISION

The first complaint relating to the TWA Flight 800 crash was
filed on October 24, 1996, by Catherine Dadi as the personal
representative of her late husband's estate.' The case, filed in
can enact. The present bill is designed to remedy this situation by
giving a right of action for death, to be enforced in the courts of
admiralty ....
The right is made exclusive for deaths on the high
seas, leaving unimpaired the rights under State statutes as to deaths on

waters within the territorialjurisdiction of the States.
Id. at 284 (emphasis added).
17

See Statement by James Hall, Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board

("NTSB"), at the opening of the NTSB Investigative HearingInto the Crash of 7WA Flight
800; Baltimore, Maryland, Dec. 8, 1997 (visitedJune 11, 2000) <http:www.ntsb.gov/
speeches/jh971208.htm>.
18 See Vernon S. Ellingstad, The Pursuit of Fuel Flammability Issues in the TWA
Flight 800 Accident Investigation, October 20, 1998 (visited June 11, 2000) <http://
www.ntsb.gov/speeches/ve8981021 .htm>.
19 See In re Air Crash Off Long Island, New York, On July 17, 1996, No. 96 Civ.
7986, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8044, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 1998).

812

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

the SDNY, named TWA and The Boeing Company ("Boeing"),
the manufacturer of the 747, as defendants. 21 Several other similar lawsuits were subsequently filed throughout the country,
some of which named Hydro-Aire, Inc., the manufacturer of a
boost fuel pump that was allegedly incorporated into the 747, as
an additional defendant. 21 In early 1997, the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation transferred all wrongful death cases
brought by the family members or estate administrators of passengers ("Plaintiffs") to the SDNY for consolidated pretrial proceedings.22 As of June 1998, 145 cases had been consolidated
2
before the SDNY. 1

On July 1, 1997, TWA, Boeing, and Hydo-Aire (the "Defendants") filed a motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims for nonpecuniary damages and to exclude remedies under all law other
than DOHSA.24 In their motion, the Defendants asserted that
DOHSA was the exclusive law governing claims for damages
pleaded in Flight 800 lawsuits.2 ' Boeing and Hydro-Aire maintained that DOHSA should apply because the deaths occurred
more than three nautical miles "(a 'marine league')" from the
New York shoreline; therefore, the Defendants claimed, the
deaths occurred over the "high seas. ' '2' TWA made the same
argument in its motion, additionally contending that DOHSA
governed the claims against the carrier under the Warsaw Convention. 27 The Defendants essentially argued that, because
DOHSA applied, nonpecuniary losses could not be recovered by
the passengers' beneficiaries. 21 In other words, while the Defendants agreed that DOHSA authorized the beneficiaries' recovery for fair and just compensation, they proffered that
application of 46 U.S.C. § 762 precluded damages for loss of society, survivor's grief, decedents' pre-death pain and suffering,
and punitive damages.2
See id. at *2-3.
See id. at *3
22 See id. at *34.
23 See id. at *4.
24 See id. at *2, *4.
25 See In re Air Crash Off Long Island, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8044, at *5.
26 See id. at *5-6; see also 46 U.S.C. app. § 761.
27 See In re Air Crash Off Long Island, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8044, at *6. The
Defendants further argued that DOHSA applied to all cases arising out of the
Flight 800 accident, regardless of whether a decedent was a United States citizen
or foreign domiciliary. See id.
28 See id.
29 See id.
21
21

ACCIDENTS ON THE HIGH SEAS
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In response to the Defendants' motion, the Plaintiffs claimed
that DOHSA did not apply to their claims.3 0 They argued that
"'high seas' and 'beyond a marine league from the shore' are
independent conditions, both of which must be satisfied before
DOHSA may be applied."" The Plaintiffs accepted the NTSB's
finding that the accident occurred eight nautical miles off the
New York shoreline. 2 The Plaintiffs therefore acquiesced that
the accident occurred more than three nautical miles from the
New York shoreline, i.e., "beyond a marine league from the
shore. 33 However, they contended that the deaths did not occur on the "high seas." 4 The Plaintiffs argued "that 'high seas'
is the compliment to 'territorial seas,' and therefore the two cannot overlap. 35 The thrust of the Plaintiffs' "high seas" argument focused on the 1988 Presidential Proclamation No. 5928
("Proclamation"), whereby President Reagan redefined the
boundary of United States territorial waters to be twelve nautical
miles from the shore.3 6 According to the Plaintiffs, DOHSA did
not apply to accidents occurring between three and twelve nau30

See id. at *6-7.

31 Id. at

*7.

See In re Air Crash Off Long Island, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8044, at *7.
33 See id.
34 See id.
32

35 Id.
36

See id. In relevant part, the Proclamation reads:
The Territorial sea of the United States is a maritime zone extending beyond the land territory and internal waters of the United
States over which the United States exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction, a sovereignty and jurisdiction that extend to the airspace
over the territorial sea, as well as to its bed and subsoil.
Extension of the territorial sea by the United States to the limits
permitted by international law will advance the national security
and other significant interests of the United States.
Now, THEREFORE, I, RONALD REAGAN, by the authority
vested in me as President by the Constitution of the United States
of America, and in accordance with international law, do hereby
proclaim the extension of the territorial sea of the United States of
America ... and any other territory or possession over which the
United States exercises sovereignty.
The territorialsea of the United States henceforth extends to 12 nautical
miles from the baseline of the United States determined in accordance with
internationallaw.
Nothing in this Proclamation:
(a) extends or otherwise alters existing Federal or State law or any
jurisdiction, rights, legal interests, or obligations derived therefrom; or
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tical miles from the shore of a State.3 7 Therefore, the Plaintiffs
claimed that DOHSA did not govern their claims because the
deaths occurred eight nautical miles from the shore."
The SDNY began its ruling on the nonpecuniary damages issue, which it recognized as one of "first impression" for the Second Circuit, " by seeking to determine whether DOHSA was
applicable to the case. 4" First, focusing on the "plain meaning"
of 46 U.S.C. § 761, the SDNY held:
The most natural reading of this text is that a death must occur
both on the high seas and beyond a marine league from the
shore for DOHSA to apply. If a death occurred (1) neither on
the high seas nor beyond a marine league; (2) on the high seas,
but not beyond a marine league; or (3) beyond a marine league,
but not on the high seas, then DOHSA does not apply. 4
The Defendants had interpreted § 761 to give "high seas" and
"beyond a marine league" equivalent meanings.42 The SDNY rejected this argument, noting that such an interpretation of
§ 761 would essentially make the phrase "high seas" statutory
surplusage.4" The court determined, "[T] o comply with the language of the statute, a death must be on the high seas."4 4 The
Defendants attempted to argue that other courts had utilized
the "beyond a marine league" requirement without applying the
alternative "high seas" test.45 However, the SDNY determined
that other courts deciding DOHSA cases had used the phrases
"high seas" and "beyond a marine league" interchangeably, with(b) impairs the determination, in accordance with international
law, of any maritime boundary of the United States with a foreign
jurisdiction....
Proclamation No. 5928, 54 Fed. Reg. 777 (1989) (emphasis added) [hereinafter
Proclamation].
'7 See In re Air Crash Off Long Island, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8044, at *7.
""
See id.
,' The SDNY also declared that only one other court, in the Eastern District of
Louisiana, has addressed a similar issue. Id. at *7-8; see aLso Francis v. Hornbeck
Offshore (1991) Corp., No. 96-608, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 526 (E.D. La. Jan. 17,
1997) (holding that the wording of the Proclamation neither alters DOHSA's
applicability beyond one marine league from the shoreline nor extends the
State's jurisdiction).
• In re Air Crash Off Long Island, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8044, at *7-8.
4 /d. at *9.
,12 I .
See id. at *9 (citing Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 574 (1995)).
In re Air Crash Off Long Island, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8044, at *9.
45 See id.at *10.
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out expressly discussing the SDNY's newly crafted two-tiered
inquiry.46
In its ruling, the SDNY provided that the essential issues relating to DOHSA's applicability demanded consideration of: 1) the
dependent or independent meanings of "beyond a marine
league" and "high seas"; and 2) the definition of "high seas."47
The SDNY then held that reading DOHSA in context gives
"high seas" and "beyond a marine league" independent meanings.4" First, the court found no textual basis for the Defendants' argument that § 767 defines the only waters not subject to
DOHSA.49 Second, the court noted that the Defendants' contention that the Congress intended DOHSA to apply everywhere
except state territorial waters was inconsistent with § 761, which
also excluded waters within a marine league of "the District of
Columbia or the Territories or dependencies of the United
States

. .

. " from DOHSA's reach.5" Because those waters listed

in § 761 are not listed in § 767, the SDNY held that § 767 cannot
define all waters not subject to DOHSA.51
The SDNY next considered the appropriate definition for
"high seas" under DOHSA. 52 The court held that "[t]he weight
of authority establishes that the term 'high seas' at the time
DOHSA was enacted meant non-sovereign waters. 53 Once the
46 See id.
47 See id. at *10-11.
48 See id. at *11 (citing United States v. Bonanno Organized Crime Family, 879

F.2d 20, 24 (2d Cir. 1989)).
49 In re Air Crash Off Long Island, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8044, at *13. The issue
of reading DOHSA in context to glean statutory interpretation was raised by the
Defendants' use of 46 U.S.C. § 767 to argue that DOHSA applies to accidents
occurring three nautical miles or more from the shoreline. See id. at *11-12. Section 767 provides, in relevant part, that DOHSA does not apply "to the Great
Lakes or to any waters within the territorial limits of any State, or to any navigable
waters in the Panama Canal Zone." 46 U.S.C. § 767 (emphasis added). The Defendants asserted that the waters addressed in § 767 were the only waters not
subject to DOHSA. See In re Air Crash Off Long Island, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8044,
at *12. To support their three-nautical mile threshold, the Defendants maintained that, at the time DOHSA was passed, the three-nautical mile limit-i.e., one
"marine league"-defined State territory for most States. See id. Therefore, the
Defendants argued "that interpreting [§ 761] to fix the definition of high seas for
DOHSA purposes at a marine league[-three nautical miles-]is consistent with
the purported Congressional intent to exclude merely state territorial waters."
Id.
5) See id. at *13 (quoting 46 U.S.C. app. § 761).
51 In re Air Crash Off Long Island, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8044, at *13.
52 See id. at *22.
53 Id.
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SDNY classified "high seas" as non-territorial (i.e., international)
waters, it considered the Proclamation. The SDNY determined
that the Proclamation redefined the "territorial sea" without expressly mentioning the term "high seas. 54 However, the court
declared that "since the high seas is defined for DOHSA purposes to be international waters not subject to any sovereign,
and the Proclamation extended the federal sovereign territory
to twelve nautical miles, the effect of the Proclamation is to
redefine high seas to lay seaward of twelve miles from the
shore." 5 The court also noted that the Federal Aviation Administration (the "FAA") issued a rule following the Proclamation's
release consistent with the court's interpretation.56 Denying the
Defendants' motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims for nonpecuniary damages, the SDNY held:
In sum, since the "high seas" are the waters beyond the territorial
"

sea, and since the Proclamation extends the territorial sea to
twelve miles from the shore, then the deaths in the instant case
occurring eight miles from the shore of New
York occurred in
57
the territorial sea, and not in the high seas.
D.

MOTION TO DISMISS NONPECUNIARY DAMAGESSECOND CIRCUIT'S DECISION

The Defendants appealed the SDNY's decision to the Second
Circuit, which rendered a decision on March 29, 2000, seven
days before Public Law 106-181 amended DOHSA through section 404.58 The Second Circuit framed the issue as "whether
DOHSA applies to an airplane crash in United States territorial
waters roughly eight miles from the coast of the United
States."5 9 The Second Circuit affirmed the SDNY's decision,
with two of the three circuitjudges on the panel concluding that
See id. at *25.
Id. at *25-26.
See id. at *26. Shortly after the signing of the Proclamation, the FAA issued a
regulation expanding its jurisdiction over the "new United States territory." Id.
Specifically, the rule amended Parts 71 and 91 of the Federal Aviation Regulations "to extend controlled airspace and the applicability of flight rules to the
airspace overlying the waters between 3 and 12 nautical miles from the U.S.
coast." 54 Fed. Reg. 264 (1989).
57 In re Air Crash Off Long Island, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8044, at *32-33.
58 See In reAir Crash Off Long Island, NewYork, On July 17, 1996, 209 F.3d 200
(2d Cir. 2000); cf Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the
21st Century, § 404 Pub. L. No. 106-181, 114 Stat. 61 (codified as amended 46
U.S.C. app. §§ 761, 762 (1994)) [hereinafter Pub. L. No. 106-181].
59 In re Air Crash Off Long Island, 209 F.3d at 201.
54
55
56
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the Plaintiffs' interpretation of DOHSA's language more aptly
reflected the meaning and purpose of the statute. 60 The dissentingjudge disagreed, stating that the pertinent remedial scheme
for deaths occurring off the coast of the United States is a matter of legislative policy that should not be addressed by the
courts. 6611 While the Second Circuit's decision has essentially
been codified by Public Law 106-181's amendment of DOHSA
through section 404, we must analyze its decision because, as
provided below,6 2 the amended DOHSA provisions will prove
problematic in application and as a matter of sound policy.63 To
resolve these problems, litigants will need to turn to case law.
Because the Second Circuit's decision addresses problems created by Public Law 106-181's amendment of DOHSA through
section 404, we will discuss those portions of the opinion that
have not been superceded by enactment of Public Law 106-181.
1.

Majority Opinion

The majority began its ruling by discussing the background of
DOHSA, citing pre-DOHSA cases reaching drastically different
results. The majority provided that the tension between these
64 The Hamilton,6" and La Bourgogne
66
cases-i.e., The Harrisburg,
"created jurisdictional fictions and serious problems in choice of
law that sometimes denied recovery altogether."67 These
problems, the majority stated, caused the Maritime Law Associa6o See id. at 215.
61 See id. at 226 (SotomayorJ., dissenting). WhileJudge Sotomayor stated that
Congress was the appropriate body to provide the remedial scheme for the
deaths at issue, we will demonstrate that section 404 of Public Law 106-181 fails to
provide this remedial scheme, thus forcing courts to address the remedies available in federal waters. See infra Part IV.C.
62 See infra Part 1V.C.
63The Second Circuit twice mentioned House Bill 1000, which would be
signed into Public Law 106-181, once in the majority opinion and once in the
dissent. See In re Air Crash Off Long Island, 209 F.3d at 215 n.24, 226 n.13.
64119 U.S. 199 (1886). In The Harrisburg,which was later overruled by Moragne
v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970), the United States Supreme Court
denied recovery to the widow of a seaman who sought recovery under the general
maritime law because she did not bring suit within the applicable state statute of
limitations. See id. at 213-14.
65207 U.S. 398 (1907).
66 210 U.S. 95 (1908).
67 In re Air Crash Off Long Island, 209 F.3d at 204 (citing Offshore Logistics, Inc.
v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 235 (1986) (Powell,J., concurring inpart and dissenting in part)).
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tion ("MLA") to begin drafting a bill that would become
DOHSA."
The majority gave significant attention to DOHSA's initial legislative history supporting the definition of "high seas" as those
seas that lie beyond United States territorial waters."' As explained below, the enactment of section 404 of Public Law 106181 did not focus on the definition of "high seas" as being determinative of the amended DOHSA's reach."y ' Instead, Congress
created an express frontier at twelve nautical miles.7 ' While
much of the majority's discussion was rendered mute by enactment of section 404 of Public Law 106-181 (i.e., the portion that
solely addresses the definitions of "high seas" and "beyond a
marine league" to analyze DOHSA's scope), our discussion below reveals that portions of the majority's opinion could apply to
litigation arising after Public Law 106-181's enactment.
The majority's decision could be interpreted to allow the application of state remedies, in conjunction with the application
of the substantive general maritime law, for commercial airline
accidents occurring in Federal waters. In its ruling, the majority
determined:
[A]pplying DOHSA to federal territorial waters would subvert
DOHSA's purpose of creating a remedy where none existed
before, ratherthan displacingpreexistingstate or federal remedies. The

legislative history 'indicates that Congress intended to ensure the
continued availability of a remedy, historically provided by the States,
for deaths in territorialwaters.. . .' Congress intended to exclude

federal territorial waters from the scope of DOHSA because federal and state common-law remedies already existed for deaths in those
waters.72

In a footnote, the majority criticized the dissent's objection
"that '[n]o clear remedies existed for wrongful death beyond
state territorial waters after The Harrisburg,a gap in the law that
DOHSA was designed expressly to fill.'"Y "This argument," the
majority contended, "simply ignores the cases in which the
68 See id.

11 See generaty id. at 205-12 (focusing on the United States Supreme Court's
understanding of "high seas" at the time of DOHSA's enactment, the structure
and purpose of DOHSA, the meaning of "high seas" in the period from DOHSA's
enactment to President Reagan's issuance of Proclamation 5928, and the application of DOHSA to foreign territorial waters).
711See infra Part IV.A.
71 See id.
72 In re Air Crash off Long Island, 209 F.3d at 209 (emphasis added).
7: Id. at 209 n.14.
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courts, including the Supreme Court, provided remedies in an
74
' The maeffort to ameliorate the harsh rule of The Harrisburg."
jority then directed the reader to Section II.A. for a listing of
those cases-The Hamilton and La Bourgogne.75 The majority impliedly argues that The Hamilton and La Bourgogne may now
stand for the proposition, given DOHSA's non-applicability, that
state remedies may supplement the general maritime law in federal waters."
In The Hamilton, the United States Supreme Court held that
one citizen of Delaware could bring a lawsuit in admiralty
against another Delaware citizen under Delaware's wrongful
death statute, even though the death had occurred on the high
seas.77 The case involved the collision of two vessels, both belonging to Delaware corporations. 78 The Court emphasized that
the Delaware wrongful death statute at issue controlled the liabilities of the corporations, "existing only by virtue of the laws of
Delaware, and permanently within its jurisdiction, for the consequences of conduct set in motion by them there, operating
outside the territory of the State, it is true, but within no other
territorial jurisdiction.

' 79

Delaware would also have the author-

ity to have its statute applied, the Court held, to citizens domiciled in the state, "even when personally on the high seas."8 " To
accentuate its point, the Court determined, "No one doubts the
power of England or France to govern their own ships upon the
high seas."8
The majority also cited the United States Supreme Court's decision in La Bourgogne to suggest that state remedies may be
available in claims arising out of an accident in federal waters.
In La Bourgogne, the Court held that French law could be applied in a limitation of liability proceeding addressing an accident between French and British vessels where the collision
74 Id.

75 See id.
76 This implication is further indicated in other sections of the majority's opinion. Without providing a supporting citation, the majority determined that "[i]t
would be particularly inappropriate to displace preexisting state or federal remedies
where, as here, recovery could be more generous than under DOHSA." See id. at
209.
77 See The Hamilton, 207 U.S. at 403.
78 See id. at 402.
7,)[d. at 403.
80

Id.

81 Id.
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occurred on the high seas.12 Aside from this limitation of liability proceeding, the Court determined that, where the contesting
vessels belonged to different nations having different laws, the
maritime law would properly furnish the rule of decision, since
"it would be unjust to apply the laws of either to the exclusion of
the other."8 3
2. Dissenting Opinion
Like the majority opinion, much of the dissent's opinion regarding the scope of DOHSA has been rendered moot by Public
Law 106-181's amendments of DOHSA through section 404.
However, the dissent does answer the majority's suggestion that
state remedies can be applied in federal waters-an issue that
remains relevant despite section 404 of Public Law 106-181's revision of DOHSA's scope.8 4 In his dissenting opinion, Judge
Sotomayor provided:
I am also unconvinced that a satisfactory remedy would exist for
deaths occurring in the disputed zone if we were to supplant
DOHSA's application in that zone with general federal maritime
law. In the zero to three nautical mile zone, state statutory and
state common law remedies are available to supplement general
federal maritime law, but this would not necessarily be the case
in the disputed zone, where state law is inapplicable. 5
82

See La Bourgogne, 210 U.S. at 115.

8IId. at 116 (quoting The Scotland, 105 U.S. 24, 29 (1881)); see also WILLIAM
464 n.22 (1994).
In a footnote, the dissent specifically took issue with the majority's use of
Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199 (1996), a case that will be discussed
further below. See In re Air Crash Off Long Island, 209 F.3d at 219 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting). Addressing cases cited by the Defendants/Appellants regarding
DOHSA's application to foreign territorial waters, the majority had provided that
"[t]hese decisions do not require-or even suggest-the application of DOHSA
to the territorial waters of the United States, where plaintiffs already have a state or
federal remedy." Id. at 212 (citing Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 215-16 (emphasis added)).
Despite the majority's suggestion that state remedies could be applied in federal
waters, the dissent noted that Yamaha could not be read to allow such recovery.
See id. at 219 n.6 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Instead, the dissent argued, Yamaha
spoke to remedies available when deaths occur in the territorial waters of a state
or state-like entity. See id.
85 In re Air Crash Off Long Island, 209 F.3d at 225 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Judge Sotomayor defined the "disputed zone" as "the zone of waters lying between three and twelve nautical miles seaward of the U.S. Coast." Id. at 216. Of
course, that disputed zone would be from nine to twelve nautical miles in Texas
and Florida. See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
TETLEY, INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT OF LAWS
84
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Judge Sotomayor also discussed the majority's undermining
of the maritime law's uniformity principle.86 The majority's
opinion, according to the dissent, created four maritime zones
wherein different laws control. 7 Uniformity, the dissent argued, would be better maintained under the two-zone regime
that had historically governed wrongful death cases occurring
on the high seas. 8
E.

SECOND CIRCUIT'S DECISION ANALYZED

As discussed below, Public Law 106-181's amendment of
DOHSA through section 404 has solidified DOHSA's boundaries, thus mooting the scope arguments made in the TWA litigation. However, the Second Circuit's decision in In re Air Crash
off Long Island, New York, remains relevant to the litigation of two
important issues. The first issue involves the majority's suggestion that state remedies may be applied to litigation arising out
of deaths in federal territorial waters. The remaining, broader
issue concerns the uniformity of the maritime law, a policy issue
discussed by the dissent. Although section 404 of Public Law
106-181 puts the scope issue to rest, these issues will likely invoke
an extensive analysis of the Second Circuit's decision in an attempt to ascertain the operation of the amended DOHSA
provisions.
1.

Majority's Suggestion-Borrowingof State Remedies Laws

When Congress enacted section 404 of Public Law 106-181, it
failed to expressly provide what law would govern wrongful
deaths occurring in federal territorial waters. 9 This failure will
86 See In reAir Crash Off Long Island, 209 F.3d at 225 (SotomayorJ., dissenting).
87 See id.
88 The dissent provided:

The applicable law in the majority's four zones would be: (1) zero
to three nautical miles: state law and federal common law; (2) three
to twelve nautical miles: federal common law; (3) beyond twelve
nautical miles: DOHSA; (4) foreign territorial waters: ? (the majority leaves this open rather than confronting the abundant case law
applying DOHSA in foreign territorial waters). Uniformity would
be better promoted under the current two-zone regime: (1) zerothree nautical miles: state law and federal common law; (2) beyond
3 nautical miles: DOHSA.
Id.
89 See infra Part IV.A. Congress' provision in 46 U.S.C. § 761, as amended, that
DOHSA will not apply and "the rules applicable under Federal, State, and other
appropriate law shall apply" is hardly an express legislative statement of what
remedies standard will replace DOHSA. See id.
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likely cause plaintiffs to cite the majority's opinion for the proposition that state remedies laws may be borrowed when a death
occurs in federal waters. This proposition is soundly defeated by
the United States Constitution and the inapplicability of the majority's cited United States Supreme Court precedent.
a.

The Constitution Prevents the Application of State Law
In The Lottawanna, the United States Supreme Court addressed the concept of applying state laws to claims governed by
the general maritime law.90 In The Lottawanna, the Court held:
One thing, however, is unquestionable; the Constitution must
have referred to a system of law coextensive with, and operating
uniformly in, the whole country. It certainly could not have been
the intention to place the rules and limits of maritime law under
the disposal and regulation of the several states, as that would
have defeated the uniformity and consistency at which the Constitution aimed on all subjects of a commercial character affecting the intercourse of the States with each other or with foreign
states. 9'
This language supports the argument that the uniformity of

the maritime law is a constitutional requirement that cannot be
ignored by courts interpreting the effect of the Second Circuit's
decision. Application of state remedies laws to federal waters,

where the general maritime law controls, would be a violation of
this constitutional mandate.

b. United States Supreme Court Precedent Does Not
Support the Application of State Law
The majority's opinion in In re Air Crash Off Long Island, New
York, cited the United States Supreme Court's decisions in The

Hamilton and La Bourgogne for the implicit proposition that state
remedies may be borrowed, to be applied in conjunction with
the general maritime law, for cases arising out of deaths occurring in federal territorial waters.92 However, in Offshore Logistics,
Inc. v. Tallentire, the United States Supreme Court drastically

limited these rulings, holding that state wrongful death statutes
could be applied to fatal accidents occurring on the high seas in
90 See The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. at 575. Below, we will explain that the general
maritime law provides the applicable law in the area affected by the amendment
of 46 U.S.C. app. § 761. See infra Part tV.C.2.a.ii.
91 The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. at 575; see also Comment, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 389
(1963).
92 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.

2000]

ACCIDENTS ON THE HIGH SEAS

823

only "limited circumstances."9 - The Tallentire Court specifically
addressed The Hamilton and determined that the case
has sometimes been understood to endorse a broader application of state law on the high seas than its holding suggested.
Some courts came to rely on dicta in The Hamilton for the "questionable" proposition that if a state wrongful death statute was
intended to extend to torts occurring on the high seas, then an
action between citizens of that State for a wrongful death on the
high seas could lie in admiralty .... There was continued doubt,
in spite of The Hamilton's dicta, as to the States' competence to
provide wrongful death relief for causes of action arising on the
high seas.9 4
The Tallentire Court determined that state wrongful death
statutes that were historically held to apply to the high seas had
limited legislative effectiveness under The Hamilton's dicta. '5
Under this dicta, the legislative jurisdiction to apply state laws
beyond their borders had to rest upon one of two theories: "either (1) that the vessel upon which the wrongful act occurred
was constructively part of the territory of the state; or (2) that
the wrongdoer was a vessel or citizen of the state subject to its
jurisdiction even when beyond its territorial limits."9 6 When
those theories were not invoked, recovery was often denied altogether.9 7 Given the prospect that courts could choose to deny
recovery altogether for deaths occurring on the high seas, where
no law governed, DOHSA was enacted to provide a remedy."
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Tallentire
clearly undermines the majority's suggestion that state remedies
can be applied in federal territorial waters. The "limited circumstances" are not present in commercial airline accidents
arising from international transportation and occurring on the
high seas. In these cases, the parties are often from several different states and foreign countries. Therefore, unlike Delaware
in The Hamilton, no state possesses the legislative jurisdiction to
apply its remedies laws. 9
Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 212 (1986).
Id. at 213.
95 See id. at 214 (citing Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, 121 F. Supp. 85, 88 (N.D.
Cal. 1954)).
93
94

96 Id.

See id. (citing The Middlesex, 253 F. 142 (D. Mass. 1916)).
See id. (citing Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 393
(1970)).
99Like The Hamilton, La Bourgogne is equally inapplicable to cases arising out of
commercial airline accidents occurring on the high seas. These cases do not
97

98
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Of course, DOHSA had historically provided a remedy that is
no longer available given Public Law 106-181's amendment of
that statute through section 404. However, we are not arguing
that no remedy is available. Before the Ta/lentire decision, the
United States Supreme Court, in Moragne v. States Marine Lines,
Inc., had held that DOHSA "was not intended to preclude the
availability of a remedy for wrongful death under general maritime law in situations not covered by the Act." '° Therefore, in
DOHSA's absence, Moragne directs that the applicable remedies
standard is provided by the general maritime law. The majority
did recognize the general maritime law's probable applicability.""' However, the majority's chosen language supporting the
possible application of state remedies laws-"preexisting . . .
state remedies," "remedy, historically provided by the states,"
and "state common-law remedies already exist[ing] for deaths in
those waters"-says too much.0 2 Clearly, application of State
laws to commercial airline accidents occurring in federal waters
is contrary to the United States Constitution and is unsupported
by United States Supreme Court precedent.
2. Dissent's Argument-Unifornity of the Maritime Law
Once Public Law 106-181's amendment of DOHSA through
section 404 is fully discussed below, it will become clear that
Congress has drastically undermined uniformity in the admiralty law, a principle grounded in constitutional law, by amending DOHSA as it has. The result obtained after the majority's
decision on March 29, 2000, is the same result obtained by the
amendment to DOHSA occurring seven days later. The dissent's uniformity discussion, therefore, retains force as a strong
policy argument against the consequences of DOHSA's
3
amendment.' O

involve limitation of liability proceedings, wherein State law may apply to cases
arising on the high seas.
100Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. at 402.
10, See In re Air Crash Off Long Island, 209 F.3d at 209.
102 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
103 For further analysis of the constitutional uniformity principle, see infra Part
IV.C.2.d.
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CONGRESSIONAL ACTIVITY
PUBLIC LAW 106-181, § 404

On April 5, 2000, President Clinton signed a bill into law that
'
became Public Law 106-181. 04
Section 404 of the law substantially changed DOHSA's historic application to "commercial aviation accidents" occurring on the "high seas" through its
amendment of 46 U.S.C §§ 761 and 762. With the new provisions italicized, § 761 now provides:
Right of action; where and by whom brought
(a) Subject to subsection (b), whenever the death of a person
shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring on
the high seas beyond a marine league from the shore of any
State, or the District of Columbia, or the Territories or dependencies of the United States, the personal representative of the
decedent may maintain a suit for damages in the district courts
of the United States, in admiralty, for the exclusive benefit of the
decedent's wife, husband, parent, child, or dependent relative
against the vessel, person, or corporation which would have been
liable if death had not ensued.
(b) In the case of a commercial aviation accident, whenever the death of
a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default occurringon
the high seas 12 nautical miles or closer to the shore of any State, or the
District of Columbia, or the Territories or dependencies of the United
States, this Act shall not apply and the rules applicable under Federal,
State, and other appropriate law shall apply.' °5
With enactment of § 404 of Public Law 106-181, § 762 now
provides:
Amount and apportionment of recovery
(a) The recovery in such suit shall be a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary loss sustained by the persons for whose
benefit the suit is brought and shall be apportioned among them
by the court in proportion to the loss they may severally have
suffered by reason of the death of the person by whose representative the suit is brought.
(b) (1) If the death resultedfrom a commercial aviation accident occurring on the high seas beyond 12 nautical miles from the shore of any
State, or the District of Columbia, or the Territories or dependencies of the
United States, additional compensation for nonpecuniary damages for
104 See Bill Summary & Status for the 106th Congress (visited June 18, 2000)
<http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d06:h.r.01000:>.
105 46 U.S.C. app. § 761 as amended by Act of Apr. 5, 2000, 46 U.S.C.A. app.
§ 761 (West. Supp. 2000) (emphasis added).

826

JOURNAL OFAIR LAW AND COMMERCE

wrongful death of a decedent is recoverable. Punitive damages are not
recoverable.
(2) In this subsection, the term 'nonpecuniary damages' means damages for loss of care, comfort, and companionship.'"6
Section 404(c) of Public Law 106-181 provides that the aforementioned amendments to DOHSA will apply to any death occurring after July 16, 1996."" 7
Congress had earlier considered exempting DOHSA from aviation altogether through the House's consideration of House
Bill 603. "" The difference between the effects of House Bill 603
and section 404 of Public Law 106-181 lies in section 404's statu-

tory guarantee of a federal forum through admiralty jurisdiction
for commercial airline accidents occurring beyond twelve miles
from the shore of any State.') 9

B.

THE INITIATIVE

The passing of section 404 of Public Law 106-181 was fueled
by the Congress' concern that TWA Flight 800 families, Swissair
I /d.
(i§ 762.
Pub. L. No. 106-181, 114 Stat. 61, at § 404(c).
1(,8On March 3, 1999, the United States House of Representatives voted 412-2
in favor of House Bill 603, a bill seeking to amend 49 U.S.C. § 40120(a) to exempt air crashes from DOHSA's provisions. Cecile Hatfield, Recent Developments
in Aviation Law, 21 Lw.-PILoTs B. ASS'NJ. 18 (1999). If House Bill 603 had been
enacted, the new relevant provision would have read:
§ 40120. Relationship to other laws
107

(a) Nonapplication. Except as provided in the International Navigational Rules Act of 1977 (33 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), the navigation
and shipping laws of the United States (including the Act entitled 'An
Act relating to the maintenance o" actionsfor death on the high seas and
other navigable waters, approved March 30, 1920, commonly known as the
Death on the High Seas Act (46 U.S. C. App. 761-767; 41 Stat. 53 7-538))
and the rules for the prevention of collisions do not apply to aircraft or to the navigation of vessels related to those aircraft.
Compare 49 U.S.C. § 40120(a) with H.R. 603, 106th Cong. § 1 (1999) (The emphasis indicates the new portion of § 40120(a) if H.R. 603 had been enacted.).
1119Compare H.R. 603, 106th Cong. § 1 (1999) with Pub. L. No. 106-181, supra
note 58, at § 404. If commercial airline accidents had been completely removed
from DOHSA's ambit, admiralty jurisdiction would have likely governed these
cases even without DOHSA's express grant of admiraltyjurisdiction found in 46
U.S.C. app. § 761. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 761; see infra Part IV.C.2.d. While it may
be difficult to conceptualize the practical difference between the probable effects
of House Bill 603, had it become law, and the likely effects of section 404 of
Public Law 106-181, one clear difference does arise. House Bill 603, had it become law, does not appear to be as problematic as section 404 of Public Law 106181, considering the possible constitutional shortcomings of the latter provision's
impact on the uniformity principle of the maritime law. See infra Part IV.C.2.d.
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Flight 111 families, and families of future victims of high seas
commercial airline accidents, would only be able to recover pecuniary damages under DOHSA. "' This concern was largely expressed in floor debate of House Bill 603, a preliminary bill to
section 404 of House Bill 1000, the bill which would eventually
be incorporated into Public Law 106-181. The Representatives
were especially critical of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Zicherman.'' l The Representatives referred to the
Court's application of DOHSA as "obviously unfair,"' 1 2 a "bizarre inequity,"' 3 and an "injustice.""' 4 Discussing the inequity
of limiting damage recovery to pecuniary damages, Representative Sherwood stated:
If a plane crashed on land, family members can seek redress for
losses in State courts for various different types of compensation.
However, if a loved one crashed at sea, one can only seek compensation for loss of income in a U.S. District Court.
In the case of a child or a retired person lost at sea, the Supreme Court's application of this archaic maritime law makes
that child valueless in the face of the law.
Clearly, the application of this law is patently unfair and cruel.
Why are we standing here in 1999 and applying a 1920's maritime law to modern aviation disaster claims? The time has come to
create one level playing field and one process for all airline crash
claims.' 5
10 See 145 CONG. REC. H900-02 (daily ed. March 3, 1999). The text of Public
Law 106-181, section 404(c), demonstrates a memorialization of the TWA accident through its effective date, July 16, 1996, the day before TWA Flight 800
crashed off of Long Island. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. Any death
occurring after this date would be subject to the provisions of the new DOHSA.
See 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 761, 762.
- See id. In debate, Representative Duncan stated, "[T]he Supreme Court
really surprised everyone in deciding the case of Zickerman [sic] versus Korean
Airlines in holding that the Death on the High Seas Act applies to lawsuits that
arise out of an aircraft crash in the ocean that occurs more than [three] miles
from land." Id. at H900 (statement of Rep. Duncan). Representative Duncan
continued, "I think it is fair to say that almost no one in the aviation or legal
communities believe that this Death on the High Seas Act would apply to the
TWA crash until the recent decision in the Zickerman [sic] case." Id.
112 See 145 CONG. REC. H900 (daily ed. March 3, 1999) (statement of Rep.
Lipinski).
113 See id. (statement of Rep. Shuster).
'I" See id. (statement of Rep. Duncan).
115 Id. at 901 (statement of Rep. Sherwood) (emphasis added). While Rep.
Sherwood's statement does have some emotive appeal, removal of DOHSA application to high seas commercial airline accidents would in no way create "one
level playing field" or "one process" for airline crash claims. In fact, as we have
argued and will continue to argue, the opposite would likely be the result. If
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C.

THE EFFECT OF ENACTMENT

As of this Article's publication date, the effect of the new
DOHSA provisions is far from clear. Some issues have been expressly resolved by the unambiguous text of 46 U.S.C. §§ 761
and 762, as amended by section 404 of Public Law 106-181. The
text of section 761 (b) makes it clear that DOHSA will not apply
to "commercial aviation accident[s]" occurring within twelve
nautical miles from the shore of any state or federal territory. 6
For all other "commercial aviation accident[s]" occurring
outside of the twelve nautical mile boundary, § 762(b) (1)'s text
allows for recovery of "nonpecuniary damages,"
damages in ad17
dition to § 762(a) pecuniary damages.
As discussed below, the application of DOHSA's new unambiguous text will prove onerous enough for courts in rendering
just and equitable decisions. Moreover, applying these new provisions will raise new public policy concerns. Adding insult to
injury, however, is certain textual ambiguity found in the new
DOHSA provisions. While Congress clearly defined the geographical area in which DOHSA will and will not apply, it created new problems through its use of "commercial aviation
accident" without expressly defining the term.
1. Problems Arisingfrom Textual Ambiguity
DOHSA § 761(b) provides that DOHSA will not apply to
deaths resulting from commercial aviation accidents occurring
landward of twelve nautical miles of a state or territory." 8 Beyond this twelve nautical mile threshold, DOHSA § 762(b) provides that nonpecuniary damages may be recovered for deaths
resulting from commercial aviation accidents." 9 Because Congress did not expressly define the term, litigation is sure to arise
over the definition of "commercial aviation accident." This litigation is likely to stem from the multitude of instances where
helicopters or charter aircraft for hire (i.e., aircraft other than
those owned by commercial airlines) crash, causing death on
DOHSA's applicability is removed, passengers could experience drastically different recoveries through the application of various State laws instead of DOHSA's
uniform law.
116 46 U.S.C. app. § 761(b).
117 Id. § 762(a), (b). However, § 762(b)(1) expressly prohibits recovery of punitive damages. Id. § 762(b) (1).
118 Id. § 761(b).
119

Id. § 762(b)(1).
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the high seas.120 In these cases, two alternative approaches
could resolve this interpretational issue.
a.

Definition Utilizing the Federal Aviation Regulations

Under the first approach, "commercial aviation accident" is
roughly defined by reference to the Federal Aviation Regulations ("FARs").' 2' While the term is not expressly defined in the
FARs, Part 1 defines a "commercial operator" as "a person who,
for compensation or hire, engages in the carriage by aircraft in
air commerce of persons or property .... ,122 "Air commerce" is
further defined as "interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce
or the transportation of mail by aircraft or any operation or navigation of aircraft within the limits of any Federal airway or any
operation or navigation of aircraft which directly affects, or
which may endanger safety in, interstate, overseas, or foreign air
commerce."123 Further, Black's Law Dictionary defines an "accidental" event as an occurrence happening by chance or unexpectedly. 124 Under the first approach, therefore, "commercial
aviation accident," would be defined as an unexpected or chance
event that occurs during the operation or navigation of aircraft being
operatedfor compensation or hire. It is difficult to imagine any flight
for compensation or hire that would be immune from this definition's broad reach.
b.

Definition Utilizing the Text and Legislative History

The second approach to defining "commercial aviation accident" occurs through analysis of the text and the legislative his120 In this anticipated dispute over the definition of "commercial aviation accident," there is little question-and we do not counter-argue-that "commercial
aviation accident" would encompass major commercial airline accidents such as
TWA Flight 800, Swissair Flight 111, EgyptAir Flight 990, and Alaska Airlines
Flight 261. The contentiousness of this issue is not mere conjecture on our part.
Although DOHSA has been amended for only a few months as of the date of this
Article's publication, our firm has been involved in a case whereby the plaintiff
claims that the crash of a helicopter engaged in a ferrying operation-occurring
well outside the DOHSA boundary-was a "commercial aviation accident" under
the new DOHSA provisions. In this case, the plaintiffs are claiming entitlement
to nonpecuniary damages under 46 U.S.C. §§ 762(b)(1) and (2) arising from
the death of their decedent resulting from the helicopter's crash.
121 See 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (2000).
122 Id.
123 Id. For purposes of this definition analysis, an occurrence is an "accident"
when it happens by chance or unexpectedly. See BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 31 (4th
ed. 1968).
124 See id.
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tory of 46 U.S.C. §§ 761 and 762, as amended by section 404 of
Public Law 106-181. While the text of the amended DOHSA
provisions does not expressly define "commercial aviation accident," certain implications arising from the text and its legislative history make it clear that DOHSA was amended specifically
to address litigation arising out of commercial airline accidents
occurring on the high seas. Section 404(c) of Public Law 106181 provides a textual implication supporting the new provisions' limited application to these types of accidents only. Section 404(c) reads, "The amendments made by [§§ 404(a) and
(b)] shall apply to any death occurring after July 16, 1996.' 125 It
is no coincidence that the effective date in section 404(c) is the
day before TWA Flight 800 crashed on July 17, 1996.12" The ef-

fective date outlined in section 404(c) of Public Law 106-181,
therefore, strongly supports the argument that "commercial aviation accident" means an unexpected or chance event that occurs during the operation or navigation of aircraft being operated by a
commercial airline.
The legislative history underlying the enactment of § 404 of
Public Law 106-181 also supports the above-suggested definition
of "commercial aviation accident." One noted legislative history
scholar has suggested that when judges examine legislative history, they should attempt to determine how enacting legislators
would have wanted the proposed statute to apply to the case at
bar.'27 In determining legislative intent, often the structure and
the language of the statute will supply a clue.' 28 As discussed
above, the effective date of the DOHSA amendments-July 16,
1996-provides a significant textual insinuation that the
DOHSA amendments were meant to apply to commercial airline accidents such as TWA Flight 800 or other high seas accidents involving flights being operated by commercial airlines.
Aside from this textual suggestion gleaned from a reading of the
new DOHSA provisions, other legislative history supports our
definition of "commercial aviation accident."
The legislative history underlying the passage of House Bill
603-an earlier provision that sought to remove DOHSA's applicability to high seas commercial airline accidents-supports our
view that "commercial aviation accident" was targeted to apply
125 Pub. L. No. 106-181,
121

supra note 58, at § 404(c).

See supra Part III.B.

127 See Judge Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-In the Classroom and in
the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 817 (1983).
128 See id. at 818.
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to commercial airline accidents occurring on the high seas. Representative Sherwood, House Bill 603's sponsor, provided during the bill's floor debate that he rose "in strong support of H.R.
603, The Airline Disaster Relief Act."' 2 9 During his floor debate,
he maintained that one level playing field must be established
for "all airline crash claims."' 0 Representative Sherwood also
stated that House Bill 603 should be passed to provide "equitable treatment for the families who lost loved ones in airline disasters over international waters."''
Representative Duncan,
during the same debate, discussed House Bill 603's effect on the
TWA Flight 800 litigation and stated that House Bill 603 "will
help people all over the Nation and it could help families years
from now if, God forbid, we have another similar crash in the
ocean." 13 2 Representative Forbes further discussed House Bill
603's importance, adding that the Act "would allow full compensation 3for the families of victims of aviation disasters like 7WA
13

800."'

Consideration of this floor debate clearly indicates that Congress intended to have DOHSA's amendments apply to "commercial aviation accident[s]" like TWA Flight 800, Swissair
Flight 111, EgyptAir Flight 990, and Alaska Flight 261. Application of these amendments to other accidents occurring on the
high seas is clearly unsupported by the legislative history.
Therefore, the broad definition supported by the FARs under
the first approach to defining "commercial aviation accident" is
inconsistent with the purpose of the DOHSA amendments.
Support for the FARs' broad definition of "commercial aviation accident" is further undermined by reference to the Senate
Conference Report discussing House Bill 1000, the bill that
would be signed into Public Law 106-181. In this report, Senator Specter stated:
The Death on the High Seas Act states that where the death of a
person is caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring
more than one marine league-three miles-from U.S. shores, a
personal representative of a decedent can only sue for pecuniary

loss sustained by the decedent's wife, child, husband, parent, or
dependent relative. Therefore, the families of the victims of avia12, 145 CONG. Rhc. H901 (daily ed. March 3, 1999) (statement of Rep. Sherwood) (emphasis added).
130

Id. (emphasis added).

131Id. (emphasis added).
1'
133

Id. at H900 (statement of Rep. Duncan).
Id. at H902 (statement of Rep. Forbes) (emphasis added).
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tion accidents, such as TWA 800, Swissair 111 and EgyptAir 990, all
of which occurred more than three miles offshore, were precluded from recovering non-pecuniary damages such as loss of
society or punitive damages, no matter how great the wrongful
act or neglect by an airline or airplane manufacturer.' 3 4
Senator Specter provided that enactment of House Bill 1000
effectively removed the TWA Flight 800 litigation from DOHSA
coverage.' 3 5 The Senator also stated, "[W]hile the Death on the
High Seas Act will still apply to other aviation accidents which
occurred beyond twelve miles, such as Swissair 111 and EgyptAir
990, non-pecuniary damages will now be recoverable for the first
time.""'
Senator Specter's statement certainly supports the second,
narrower approach to defining "commercial aviation accident."
A broader reading of "commercial aviation accident" lacks foundation in light of the textual suggestion resulting from and the
legislative history of Public Law 106-181's amendment of
DOHSA. Senator Specter's specific reference to notable major
airline crashes indicates that Congress intended to have the
DOHSA amendments apply only in very limited circumstances:
where a commercial airline crashes on the high seas.
2.

Problems Arisingfrom the Application of DOHSA's
Unambiguous Text

Unfortunately, the ambiguity surrounding the definition of
"commercial aviation accident" is only the beginning of the
problem. Public Law 106-181's amendment of DOHSA through
section 404 will create unparalleled mass confusion in the litigation of cases arising from commercial airline accidents occurring on the high seas. In this section of the article, we examine
the likely effects of the amendment considering 46 U.S.C.
§§ 761 and 762 separately, analyzing the amended provisions
with the case law likely to govern pending and future cases. Further, we will discuss the admiralty jurisdiction's continued viability in cases arising out of commercial airline accidents occurring
on the high seas; interestingly, admiralty jurisdiction is likely to
govern whether or not DOHSA applies. We will also address the
amendment's impact on a bedrock constitutional principle: the
'34 146 CONG. REC. S1265 (daily ed. March 8, 2000) (statement of Sen. Specter) (emphasis added).
135 See id.
136 Id. (emphasis added).
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uniformity of the admiralty law. We conclude this section of the
article by suggesting that Congress would have been betterserved, considering the amendment's impact on §§ 761 and
762, to exempt DOHSA's application to aviation altogether instead of haphazardly legislating in a manner which raises uniformity and constitutional concerns under admiralty
jurisdiction.
a.

46 U.S.C. § 761-DOHSA Inapplicable

If 46 U.S.C. § 761 is invoked to exclude DOHSA's application,
Congress provided that "the rules applicable under Federal,
State, and other appropriate law shall apply."' 13 7 Use of the word
"applicable" in this provision clearly indicates that the rules existing before enactment of section 404 of Public Law 106-181
will continue to govern in place of DOHSA, depending on
whether the crash occurs within or outside state territorial
waters.
i. Inside State TerritorialWaters-Within Three or Nine Nautical
Miles from a State Shoreline'38
If § 761(b) applies because the crash occurred "12 nautical
miles or closer to the shore of any State,"' 39 thereby excluding
DOHSA's applicability, the next logical question becomes
whether the crash occurred in state territorial waters. If the
crash occurred within state waters, the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun 4 ' governs
whether state or federal law should apply.
Yamaha involved the death of twelve-year-old Natalie Calhoun,
who was fatally injured on a jet ski manufactured by Yamaha.14'
The girl was killed when the jet ski slammed into an anchored
vessel in the waters off a hotel frontage in Puerto Rico. 142 Natalie's parents subsequently brought a lawsuit against Yamaha in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Penn13746 U.S.C. app. § 761(b) (emphasis added).
138 State territorial waters, in all States except Texas and Florida, extend to
three nautical miles from the shore of that State. See United States v. Louisiana,
363 U.S. 1, 64 (1960). The territorial waters of Texas and Florida extend to nine
nautical miles from their respective shores. Id.
1s946 U.S.C. app. § 761(b).
140 516 U.S. 199 (1996).
141 See id. at 202.
142 See id.
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sylvania, seeking damages pursuant to Pennsylvania tort law. 14-1
Yamaha moved for partial summary judgment, alleging that the
federal maritime wrongful death action recognized by the
United States Supreme Court in Moragne v. States Marine Lines,
Inc. provided the exclusive basis for recovery, displacing all remedies afforded by state law."" While the district court agreed
with Yamaha's contention that a Moragne wrongful death action
displaced state remedies, it nonetheless held that Natalie's parents could recover certain non-pecuniary damages.' 4 , The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed,
ruling that state law remedies applied in the case. 46
The United States Supreme Court also affirmed, holding that
the damages available in the case were properly governed by
state law.' 47 In so ruling, the Court determined that Congress
"ha[d] not prescribed remedies for the wrongful deaths of nonseafarers in territorial waters." 148 The Court defined "nonseafarers" as "persons who are neither seamen covered by the
Jones Act... nor longshore workers covered by the Longshore
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act ....
,,149 For wrongful
death cases involving nonseafarers perishing in state territorial
waters, the Court ruled, state law should govern the remedies
issue. 15

If an aircraft being operated by a commercial airline were to
crash within state territorial waters, DOHSA obviously would not
apply because no state's territory extends beyond the twelvemile DOHSA boundary. Moreover, Yamaha would be applied to
wrongful death claims arising out of such hypothetical accidents, allowing beneficiaries to recover pursuant to state remedies laws.' 5' Inside state territorial waters, the operation of
§ 761, as amended by section 404 of Public Law 106-181, is effective and logical. However, if an aircraft being operated by a
commercial airline crashes between the boundary of state terri1,1 See id. The Calhouns sought damages for lost future earnings, loss of society, loss of support and services, funeral expenses and punitive damages. See id.
'44See id. at 203 (citing Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375
(1970)).

,15See id.
II

See Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 204.

1'17
See id. at 216.
1,8[d. at 215.

,9Id. at 205 n.2 (citations omitted).
id. at 216.
151Yamaha would apply because airline passengers are "nonseafarers."
150 See
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torial waters and the twelve-mile boundary created by section
52
404 of Public Law 106-181, the logic of § 761 ends.
ii. Outside State Territorial Waters-Between Three or Nine
Nautical Miles to Twelve Nautical Miles from a State
5

Shoreline

Section 761 was amended by section 404 of Public Law 106181 to prevent DOHSA from applying to damage claims arising
out of commercial airline accidents, thereby allowing beneficiaries to recover nonpecuniary damages.1 54 In this section, we
argue that in federal waters (i.e., outside of state boundaries yet
inside the twelve-mile boundary created by section 404 of Public
Law 106-181), the general maritime law governs the remedies
available in damages claims arising from these accidents. Moreover, we assert that in federal waters, state law nonpecuniary
remedies may not supplement remedies available under the
general maritime law. Although contrary to § 761's design, the
amended provision's operation prevents recovery of nonpecuniary damages, as these damages are unavailable under the general maritime law. By failing to provide a federal remedies
standard to replace DOHSA, Congress has forced courts into applying the general maritime law to these accidents, thus placing
damage claimants in the same situation they were in prior to
Public Law 106-181's amendment of DOHSA through section
404.
Interestingly, this choice-of-law situation in the remedies context was expressly addressed in the brief of the Plaintiffs/Appellees to the Second Circuit in In re Air Crash Off Long Island, New
York.' 55 In their brief, the TWA Flight 800 Plaintiffs/Appellees
("Plaintiffs/Appellees") argued that "[t]he applicable law in
these cases is general maritime law, which may be supplemented
by state law." 156 To support the applicability of the general maritime law in this zone, the Plaintiffs/Appellees cited the United
52 Unfortunately, as will be explained further below, this zone is precisely
where TWA Flight 800 and Alaska Airlines Flight 261 crashed. For a discussion
addressing how this could impact the Alaska Airline litigation, see infra Part V.A.
153 Discussion in this section is limited to the area outside of state territory, but
within the twelve-mile boundary found in DOHSA.
154 See supra Part IV.A.
155 See Brief for Appellees at 47, In re Air Crash Off Long island, New York, on
July 17, 1996, 209 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2000) (No. 98-9622) [hereinafter Appellees'
Brief].
156 1(d.
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States Supreme Court's decision in Moragne v. States Marine
Lines, Inc., which acknowledged that some maritime death situations would not be covered by DOHSA.I5 7 In Moragne, the Court
recognized the existence of a wrongful death action under general maritime law and held that "'Congress intended to ensure
the continued availability of a remedy, historically provided by
the States, for deaths in territorial waters.... ,158
In their brief to the Second Circuit, the Plaintiffs/Appellees
further asserted that the general maritime law applicable in federal waters should be supplemented by state law.' 59 The Plaintiffs/Appellees cited Yamaha to further their argument that a
"general maritime law action [does] not preclude supplementation by state law."' 16 ° The Plaintiffs/Appellees provided,
" [ Yamaha] held that state law could apply, because 'Congress
has not prescribed remedies for the wrongful deaths of nonseafarers in territorial waters.' """
The Plaintiffs/Appellees were correct regarding the governing remedies standard in federal waters, absent DOHSA's applicability. The general maritime law should apply to provide
the appropriate remedies standard. However, the Plaintiffs/Appellees-and the majority in the Second Circuit's opinion for
that matter-completely misread Yamaha. In Yamaha, the
United States Supreme Court specifically addressed deaths occurring in the "territorial waters" of states or state-like entities
(i.e., Puerto Rico). The reference to "territorial waters" was not
meant to indicate the territorial waters of the United States.' 6 2
17 See id. (citing Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 397
(1970)).
1Id.
(quoting Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 397
(1970)). The Plaintiffs/Appellees, quoting Moragne, maintained, "[T]he Death
on the High Seas Act was not intended to preclude the availability of a remedy
for wrongful death under general maritime law in situations not covered by the Act."
Appellees' Brief, supra note 155, at 47 (emphasis in Appellees' Brief).
159 See id. As we have discussed, the Majority in the Second Circuit's decision
in the TWA case implicitly adopted this proposition made by the Plaintiffs/Appellees in that case. See supra Part III.D.1.
16 Appellees' Brief, supra note 155, at 47 (citing Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199 (1996)).
I1[d. at 48 (quoting Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 215
(1996)).
162 It is true that the Congress has not prescribed remedies for the wrongful
deaths of nonseafarers in federal territorial waters. However, the United States
Supreme Court in Yamaha did not discuss this specific situation. Instead, the
Court's allowance of state law supplementation was limited to the situation where
the death occurred in the territorial waters of a state or state-like entity.
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Language from the opinion supports this: "Yamaha argues that
Moragne-despite its focus on 'maritime duties' owed to maritime workers-covers the waters, creating a uniform federal
maritime remedy for all deaths occurring in state territorialwaters,
and ousting all previously available state remedies.""' 3 Later in
the opinion, the Yamaha Court noted, "Federal maritime law has
long accommodated the States' interest in regulating maritime affairs within their territorial waters."16 4 Therefore, Yamaha allows
the general maritime law to be supplemented with the law of a
state or state-like entity only when the death occurs in the territorial waters of that state or state-like entity. 1" 5
As we have discussed, Yamaha controls the determination of
which remedies standard, federal or state, will apply when a
nonseafarer dies in the territorial waters of a state or state-like
165

Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 209 (emphasis added).

1-4

Id. at 215 n.13 (emphasis added).

The Third Circuit's decision in Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., which was
later affirmed by the United States Supreme Court, further supports the view that
"territorial waters," as used in the Court's affirming opinion, are state or state-like
'65

entity territorial waters. Framing the question presented, the Third Circuit provided, "These consolidated interlocutory cross appeals before us ... present an
interesting and important question of maritime law: whether state wrongful
death and survival statutes are displaced by a federal maritime rule of decision
concerning the remedies available for the death of a recreational boater occurring
within state territorial waters, which are explicitly excluded from the reach of
[DOHSA]." Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 40 F.3d 622, 624 (3d Cir. 1994),
affd, 516 U.S. 199 (1996) (emphasis added). The Third Circuit further supported our argument by expressly defining "state territorial waters" as "waters
within the territorial limits of a state, as well as 'the coastal waters less than three
nautical miles from the shore of a state."' Id. at 624 n.1. (quoting William C.
Brown, III, Problems Arisingfrom the Intersectionof TraditionalMaritime Law and Aviation Death and Personal Injury Liability, 68 TUL. L. REv. 577, 581 (1994)). Other
cases advance the proposition that "territorial waters," as used in Yamaha, were
territorial waters of a state or state-like entity. See, e.g., Garris v. Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp., 210 F.3d 209, 212 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing Yamaha for
the proposition that "federal courts began to recognize the application of state
wrongful death statutes to fatal accidents that occurred in state territorialwaters")
(emphasis added); In reAmtrak Sunset Ltd. Train Crash in Bayou Canot, Ala., on
Sept. 22, 1993, 121 F.3d 1421, 1424 (lth Cir. 1997) (citing Yamaha's ruling that
Moragne did not provide the exclusive remedies in cases involving the deaths of
non-seamen in state territorial waters); In re Goose Creek Trawlers, Inc., 972 F.
Supp. 946, 949 (E.D.N.C. 1997) (citing Yamaha for the proposition that, where
the decedent is not a seaman, longshore worker, or person otherwise engaged in
maritime trade, and is killed in state territorialwaters, federal maritime law does
not supplant State wrongful death remedies); Blome v, Aerospatiale Helicopter
Corp., 924 F. Supp. 805, 809 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (citing Yamaha for the proposition
that states' wrongful death and survival statutes are not preempted by federal law
in cases involving the death of a non-seaman in state territorialwaters).
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entity."6' While Yamaha itself does not expressly discuss the circumstance of a nonseafarer perishing in federal waters (i.e.,
those waters outside of state territorial waters but inside
DOHSA's twelve-mile boundary), its application to nonseafarers
indicates that the decision will provide courts with the most relevant guidance to unravel the convoluted choice-of-law issues created by the new DOHSA provisions. In other words, because
courts have not previously faced this situation, Yamaha's ruling
must be examined. The decision supplies the most germane legal scenario available: remedies available
for deaths of non7
16
context.
maritime
the
seafarers in
Clearly, cited precedent in Yamaha supports our argument
that state law may not supplement the general maritime law for
damage claims arising from commercial airline accidents occurring in federal territorial waters. The Yamaha Court cited Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia for the proposition that extending state
wrongful death statutes to fatal accidents in state territorial waters was compatible with substantive maritime policies.16 In
Western Fuel, the United States Supreme Court held that its previous rulings
support the right to recover under a local statute in an admiralty
court for death occurring on navigable waters within the state when
caused by tort there committed.
As the logical result of prior decisions we think it follows that,
where death upon such waters results from a maritime tort committed on navigable waters within a state whose statutes give a right of
action on account of death by wrongful act, the admiralty courts will
entertain a libel in personam for the damages sustained by those
to whom such right is given. 1i '
Western Fuel thus demands that the tort be committed within a
state's territorial waters before a litigant utilizes that state's remedial regime. Applying Western Fuel to claims arising out of
deaths in federal waters, claimants have no right to borrow rem11;1See supra Part IV.C.2.a.i.
167Of
course, one key element is missing from the Yamaha decision that would
make it directly on point: the death in that case occurred in the territorial waters
of a state-like entity, Puerto Rico. However, support of our argument-that state
law may not be borrowed for cases arising out of federal waters-arises from precedent cited by the United States Supreme Court in Yamaha.
I';l See Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 207 (citing Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233,
242 (1921)).
16 Western Fuet, 257 U.S. at 241-42 (emphasis added).
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edies standards provided by the states. The opinion demonstrates that the locality of the tort in state waters is a necessary
condition to the supplementation of the general maritime law
with state remedial statutes. Citing Western Fuel, the United
States Supreme Court therefore would not allow state remedy
supplementation of the general maritime law for cases arising
from deaths in federal waters.
The Yamaha Court also cited the Court's decision in Romero v.
International Terminal Operating Co.,17 where the Court deter-

mined that the principle has remained that
a state, in the exercise of its police power, may establish rules
applicable on land and water within its limits, even though these
rules incidentally affect maritime affairs, provided that the state
action "does not contravene any acts of Congress, nor work any
prejudice to the characteristic features of the maritime law, nor
interfere with its proper harmony
and uniformity in its interna71
tional and interstate relations.1

Romero therefore provides that a state's remedies standard
may not apply outside of its police power limits. 172 Although the

Yamaha Court determined that state remedies could be used in
damage claims arising from the death of nonseafarers in state
territorial waters, the general maritime law must exclusively supply the remedies standard in the case of a nonseafarer's death
in
1 73
act.
to
power
police
the
has
state
no
where
federal waters,
We have argued that the general maritime law will apply to
cases arising out of commercial airline accidents occurring in
the waters outside state territory yet inside DOHSA's twelve-mile
boundary. While the general maritime law and most state laws
afford recovery of certain nonpecuniary damages, damage
awards under state remedial regimes usually exceed damage
awards provided under the general maritime law by a significant
170
171

(1941)

358 U.S. 354 (1959).
Romero, 358 U.S. at 375 n.42 (quoting just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383, 389

(emphasis added)).
Our argument against state law supplementation is not supported merely
by citation to Yamaha's cited precedent, which reveals that the tort's occurrence
within state territory is a necessary prerequisite for supplementation. Such supplementation could be contrary to the Constitution's demand for a uniform maritime law. See supra Part III.E.1.
173 It is arguable that a federal court, sitting in admiralty, could choose to apply
federal choice-of-law rules and determine that a state's remedies law applies.
However, a court doing so would be ignoring the necessary implication from
Yamaha: that state remedial supplementation presupposes the death occurring in
territorial waters of states or state-like entities.
172
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measure. 174 As Second Circuit Judge Sotomayor stated in his
dissent in In re Air Crash Off Long Island, New York, we are also
"unconvinced" that an adequate remedy would exist for deaths
175
occurring outside state waters yet within the twelve-mile zone.
Public Law 106-181's amendment of § 761 through section 404
has supplanted DOHSA's application in Judge Sotomayor's "disputed zone" with the federal general maritime law. Until Congress decides to legislate to provide a federal remedies standard
in the absence of DOHSA, certain nonpecuniary damages
should be denied to those claims arising from commercial airline accidents occurring outside of state waters yet within
DOHSA's twelve-mile boundary. The amendment of § 761
wholly fails to allow recovery of certain nonpecuniary damages
for claims in this Federal zone, where the general maritime law
is invoked to the exclusion of state laws providing more generous recoveries.
b.

46 U.S.C. § 762-DOHSA Applicable

If a commercial airline crashes beyond twelve nautical miles
from the shore of any state or state-like entity, 46 U.S.C. § 762
retains DOHSA's applicability.1 76 However, § 762(b) (1) allows
for recovery of nonpecuniary damages in addition to § 762(a)'s
pecuniary damages, yet denies the availability of punitive damages. 7 7 Section 762(b) (2) limits "nonpecuniary damages" to
damages for loss of care, comfort, and companionship.1 71 In applying § 762, courts are sure to address the extent of "nonpecuniary damages" available, even though § 762(b) (2) expressly
defines the term.

174 This explains why the defendant in Yamaha advocated for the application of
the general maritime law to the exclusion of state law. The difference in federalstate recovery likely results from the state-law availability of damages focusing on
the "deleterious effect[s]" of the death on the damage claimants-a class of damages disallowed by general maritime law wrongful death actions. See Sea-Land
Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 585 n.17 (1974). For example, recovery for
the beneficiaries' mental anguish is not permissible under the general maritime
law, because it focuses on the negative aspects of the loss. See id.; see also infra Part
IV.C.2.b.
175 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
176 46 U.S.C. app. § 762.
177 See id.

178 See id.

§ 762(b) (2).
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The nonpecuniary damages-damages for loss of care, com79
fort, and support-of § 762(b) are "loss of society" damages.1
While section 762(b) allows for recovery of "loss of society" damages, those do not include damages for mental anguish or grief,
which are not compensable in a maritime wrongful death action."1 "Loss of society" damages are concerned with "loss of
positive benefits," while mental anguish damages "represent an

emotional response to the wrongful death."''

Narrowing the

class of nonpecuniary damages which will be available with the
amendment of § 762 is important because plaintiffs in these admiralty cases often seek damages for survivor's grief and pre82
death pain and suffering.1'

179 See Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 585-86. Gaudet defined "loss of society" damages as
"embrac[ing] a broad range of mutual benefits each family member receives

from the others' continued existence, including love, affection, care, attention,
companionship, comfort, and protection." Id. at 585.
180 See id. at 585 n.17.
18,Id. The Court, discussing "loss of society" damages, favorably cited the
following:
When we speak of recovery for the beneficiaries mental anguish,
we are primarily concerned, not with the benefits they have lost,
but with the issue of compensating them for their harrowing experience resulting from the death of a loved one. This requires a
somewhat negative approach. The fundamental question in this
area of damages is what deleterious effect has the death, as such,
had upon the claimants? In other areas of damage, we focus on
more positive aspects of the injury such as what would the decedent, had he lived, have contributed in terms of support, assistance,
training, comfort, consortium, etc....
The great majority of jurisdictions, including several which do
allow damages for other types of non-pecuniary loss, hold that the
grief, bereavement, anxiety, distress, or mental pain and suffering
of the beneficiaries may not be regarded as elements of damage in
a wrongful death action.
Id. (quoting S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH 223 (1966)).
182 For example, while § 762 will not govern the damage claims in the TWA
Flight 800 litigation, the SDNY, in its opinion certifying its order for immediate
appeal to the Second Circuit, noted that the effect of its decision may allow plaintiffs to recover damages for loss of society, survivor's grief, pre-death pain and
suffering, and punitive damages. See In re Air Crash Off Long Island, New York,
on July 17, 1996, 27 F. Supp. 2d 431, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). However, Gaudet does
not allow for such recovery in the TWA case. Application of the general maritime law to these cases, arising out of a commercial airline accident occurring
over Federal waters, will prevent recovery of all nonpecuniary damages except
"loss of society" damages.
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c.

Continued Viability of Admiralty Jurisdiction

For cases arising under 46 U.S.C. § 762(b), jurisdiction is
guaranteed "in admiralty" through the operation of § 761(a).
In this article, however, we must also briefly discuss why admiralty jurisdiction continues to apply to commercial airline accidents occurring pursuant to § 761(b). We are required to
address this scenario because some litigants might seek to use
the amendment as a vehicle to argue that cases arising from
commercial airline accidents landward of the twelve-mile
boundary are not "admiralty cases" necessitating the application
of the substantive general maritime law. However, section 404
of Public Law 106-181's amendment of DOHSA does not provide a method to avert the governance of admiralty jurisdiction.
Therefore, cases arising under § 761 (b) will likely remain "in
admiralty."
The law is well-settled that, in all admiralty cases, the applicable substantive law is the general maritime law.'8 3 Historically, a

two-part test governs whether admiralty jurisdiction is proper in
any given case: (1) the wrong must occur in navigable waters
and (2) the wrong must bear a "significant relationship to traditional maritime activity. '""" The United States Supreme Court
extensively discussed this test in Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v.
Cleveland,' where the Court determined:
[T]he mere fact that the alleged wrong "occurs" or "is located"
on or over navigable waters-whatever that means in an aviation
context-is not of itself sufficient to turn an airplane negligence
case into a 'maritime tort.' It is far more consistent with the history and purpose of admiralty to require also that the wrong bear
a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity. We
hold that unless such a relationship exists, claims arising from
airplane accidents are not cognizable in admiralty in the absence
of legislation to the contrary.' 8"
At first glance, this holding appears to indicate that very few
aviation accidents would come under admiralty jurisdiction.
However, the Court proceeded to define "significant relationship to traditional maritime activity" in a manner which would
invoke the admiralty jurisdiction for accidents resulting from in183
184

See THOMAS.J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAw 123 (1987).
See id. at 74 (quoting Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249,

268 (1972)).
185 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
181,Id. at 268.
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ternational flights and occurring beyond state waters.' 87 The Executive Jet Court stated, "It could be argued . . . that if a plane

flying from New York to London crashed in the mid-Atlantic,
there would be admiralty jurisdiction over resulting tort claims
even absent a specific statute."' 8 This situation clearly would cover

those federal waters between state territorial boundaries and the
twelve-mile DOHSA boundary. In these waters, the "specific
statute" that traditionally covered these waters-DOHSA-is
now "absent" after enactment of section 404 of Public Law 106181. Therefore, admiralty jurisdiction continues to govern these
waters.' 89
Certain language used by the Executive Jet Court is particularly
relevant to litigation arising out of the TWA Flight 800 and
Alaska Airlines Flight 261 accidents, both of which resulted from
international travel and both of which occurred in the ambiguous zone outside of state waters yet within the twelve-mile
boundary. 19°' The Court observed that the application of admiralty jurisdiction to cases arising from accidents involving international travel was supported by various factors, including
possible choice-of-forum problems, choice-of-law problems, international law problems and problems involving multi-nation
conventions and treaties."'' The Court provided:
Were the maritime law not applicable, it is argued that the recov-

ery would depend upon a confusing consideration of what sub187

See id. at 269-72.

188Id. at 271 (emphasis added).
189 Immediately following the "absent a specific statute" language in Executive
Jet, the Court determined, "An aircraft [engaging in international travel] might
be thought to bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity because it would be performing a function traditionally performed by waterborne
vessels." See Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 271. Arguably, international travel in the
modern day is conducted by use of aircraft in lieu of waterborne vessels. Nonetheless, courts have continued to cite Executive Jet and apply admiraltyjurisdiction
to accidents occurring on international flights and on the high seas. See Preston
v. Frantz, 11 F.3d 357, 359 (2d Cir. 1993); In reAir Disaster Near Honolulu, Hawaii on February 24, 1989, 792 F. Supp. 1541, 1543-44 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
190 See supra Part III.B. (TWA); see also infra Part V.A. 1. (Alaska Airlines). Obviously, if a commercial airline accident occurred beyond the twelve-mile limit, 46
U.S.C. § 762, as amended by section 404 of Public Law 106-181, continues to vest
admiralty jurisdiction for cases arising from those accidents through § 761(a).
Therefore, there will be no argument that admiralty jurisdiction is inapplicable
to those cases arising out of the Swissair Flight 111 and EgyptAir Flight 990 accidents. However, other litigants-i.e., the plaintiffs in the TWA and Alaska Airlines cases-are likely to argue ExecutiveJet for the proposition that, landward of
the twelve-mile DOHSA boundary, admiralty jurisdiction does not govern.
19, See Executive jet, 409 U.S. at 271-72.
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stantive law to apply, i.e., the law of the forum, the law of the
place where each decedent [or injured party] purchased his
ticket, the law of the place where the plane took off, or perhaps,
the law of the point of destination.'
This language supports admiralty jurisdiction over cases arising out of the TWA Flight 800 and Alaska Airlines Flight 261
accidents, both of which involved "an aircraft transporting people from several nations [which met] a tragic end in federal territory not belonging to any state."' 93
d.

Uniformity of the Maritime Law

Once admiralty jurisdiction is found to govern a lawsuit, either by statute-46 U.S.C. § 761 (a)-or by the case's "significant
relationship to traditional maritime activity," the principles of
uniformity in the admiralty law must be considered. In this section of the article, we discuss this uniformity canon in light of
the amendment of §§ 761 and 762 through section 404 of Public Law 106-181.
i.

46 U.S.C. § 761

Uniformity of the maritime law is a constitutionally-based axiom providing that the federal admiralty law should operate
consistently throughout the country.' 9 4 In The Lottawanna, the
United States Supreme Court determined that the uniform operation of the federal admiralty law is constitutionally required. 9 ' Specifically, the Court in The Lottawanna held that
the framers of the United States Constitution did not intend to
1' Id. at 272 n.23 (quoting 7 A.J. Moore, Federal Practice, Admiralty para. 330
[5], p. 3774 (2d ed. 1972)).
193 In reAir Crash Off Long Island, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8044, at *33. Indeed, if
admiralty jurisdiction did not govern these cases, courts considering the "law of
the forum" would come up empty handed in looking at federal waters where no
state law controls. Moreover, application of the law where each decedent purchased his or her ticket would result in drastically different recoveries across the
board. Finally, application of the law of departure or destination would often
result in the application of a law lacking cognizable relation to the parties.
194 See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 401
(1970) (citing
The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. 558, 575 (1875)).
195See The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. at 575. Analysis of The Lottawanna further supports our argument that state laws may not be borrowed for application in federal
waters by considering the nexus between uniformity and constitutionality. For an
analysis of the constitutional consequences of the application of state laws in federal waters, see generally Comment, 51 CALIF. L. REv. 389, 404 (1963).
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place the maritime law's rules and limits under the command
and regulation of the individual states.'
The original DOHSA Congress recognized this uniformity
principle grounded in constitutional law. When DOHSA was initially contemplated, certain members of the judiciary supported
DOHSA's enactment, citing the need for a uniform federal law
to correct the injustices
arising from the non-uniform nature of
19 7
state remedies.

Despite our assertion that state remedies may not constitutionally apply to deaths in federal waters, Congress has invited
courts, when the time comes to apply the amended 46 U.S.C.
§ 761, to supplement the general maritime law with state remedies. 98 In doing so, today's Congress has re-created the problem the original DOHSA Congress sought to remedy: the nonuniform and constitutionally-questionable application of state
laws to deaths occurring on the high seas. While the original
DOHSA Congress sought to remedy the non-uniformity that existed before DOHSA was enacted, today's Congress has resurrected the uniformity problem. This non-uniformity will likely
cause injustice to occur, as beneficiaries' recovery will vary substantially, depending on which state law is borrowed to supplement the general maritime law. The amendment of § 761,
therefore, undermines the uniformity principal of the maritime
law and could very well be unconstitutional as a result.' 9
ii.

46 U.S.C. § 762

The maritime law's uniformity principle is further undermined by Public Law 106-181's amendment to 46 U.S.C. § 762
through section 404. One of DOHSA's defining and historical
characteristics has been that recovery is limited to the pecuniary
196 See The Lottawanna,88 U.S. at 575; see also supra note 91 and accompanying

text.
19 See 52 CONG. REC. 284 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1914) (quoting Aug. 22, 1913,
letter from Judge Harrington Putnam to Hon. E.Y. Webb).
198 This invitation arises from Congress' provision that, when DOHSA is inapplicable to a commercial aviation accident occurring landward of the twelve-mile
mark, "the rules applicable under Federal, State, and other appropriate law shall
apply." 46 U.S.C. app. § 761(b).
- Uniformity is further undermined by exempting DOHSA from application
to deaths arising from "commercial aviation accidents" while retaining applicability to all other forms of maritime death. For all other types of maritime death
occurring in Federal waters, DOHSA remains applicable. If uniformity of the
maritime law means anything, it means that recovery should be consistent and
should not depend on whether the event was a "commercial aviation accident."
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loss suffered as a result of the maritime death.2 '..° However, Congress has provided that this characteristic does not apply to commercial aviation accidents. 201 Cases brought under § 762(b)
2
2
continue to be cases brought under the admiralty jurisdiction; 11

as a result, the constitutional uniformity mandate discussed in
The Lottawanna continues to apply to these cases. The operation
of § 762(b) therefore violates this constitutional mandate and
any constitutional attack against its operation could be upheld.
e.

Aggregate Effect of DOHSA's Amendment

When the aggregate effect of Public Law 106-181's amendment to DOHSA through section 404 is considered, it becomes
clear that Congress would have been better served to remove
DOHSA's application to aviation altogether. 21'- However, we do
not suggest that Congress should have left the families of commercial airline accident victims without remedial recourse. Instead, we argue that Congress would be well-served to replace
the non-uniform and constitutionally-suspect new DOHSA provisions with a federal remedies standard for the beneficiaries of
commercial airline accident victims. While the United States
Supreme Court in ExecutiveJet limited its holding-i.e., that admiralty jurisdiction does not apply-to domestic aviation accidents,
we find that the following language from the opinion is particularly applicable here:
It may be, as the petitioners argue, that aviation tort cases should
be governed by uniform substantive and procedural laws, and
that such actions should be heard in the federal courts as to
avoid divergent results and dtIplicitous litigation in multi-party
cases. But for this Court to uphold federal admiralty jurisdiction
in a few wholly fortuitous aircraft cases would be a most quixotic
way of approaching that goal. If federal uniformity is the desired
goal with respect to claims arising from aviation accidents, Congress is free under the Commerce Clause to enact legislation applicable to all such accidents, whether occurring on land or
water, and adapted to the specific characteristics of air

commerce. 204
211)See
201
202

46 U.S.C. app. § 761(a).

See id. § 762(b).
See id. § 761 (a).

In fact, such a removal was initially contemplated by the draft bills leading
up to House Bill 1000, which was signed into Public Law 106-181. See supra Part
IV.B.
2113

2114

Executive/et, 409 U.S. at 273-74.
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The legislative history underlying DOHSA's amendment
reveals an apparent congressional-and therefore nationalconcern for beneficiaries' ability to recover in these cases.
While we understand this concern, it should not be addressed in
an admiralty setting, wherein the United States Constitution demands adherence to uniformity. Instead of haphazardly legislating around DOHSA, it is time for Congress to supply a federal
remedies standard to provide the needed uniformity these
cases-arising from high seas commercial airline accidents-demand. Without such legislation, courts will reach bizarre and
unjust results after engaging in a convoluted choice-of-law analysis. More importantly, courts risk the possibility of unconstitutionally subverting the maritime law by continued application of
admiralty principles to cases arising out of commercial airline
accidents occurring on the high seas.
V.

ALASKA AIRLINES FLIGHT 261/EGYPTAIR FLIGHT
990/SWISSAIR FLIGHT 111 EXISTING OR
FUTURE LITIGATION

Passage of section 404 of Public Law 106-181 will drastically
change the disposition of existing or future litigation arising
from commercial airline accidents occurring on the high seas.
Below, we discuss post-TWA Flight 800 cases in light of Public
Law 106-181's amendment of DOHSA and the Second Circuit's
decision in In re Air Crash Off Long Island, New York, where the
opinion remains applicable. °5
A.
1.

ALASKA AIRLINES FLIGHT

261

Background

On January 31, 2000, Alaska Airlines Flight 261, a Boeing (McDonnell Douglas) MD-83 bound from Puerto Vallarta, Mexico,
to San Francisco, California, crashed into the Pacific Ocean off
the California coast, killing all eighty-eight passengers aboard.2 ""
While the cause of the crash is currently under investigation,
NTSB preliminary reports indicate that the jackscrew/gimbal
nut assembly from the aircraft's horizontal stabilizer failed, caus205While
we will not expressly consider the possible judicial disposition of the
TWA Flight 800 cases, Flight 800's crash location-8 nautical miles from the New
York shoreline-places it in the same 46 U.S.C. app. § 761(b) waters as Alaska
Airlines Flight 261, discussed below.
2o See NTSB Identification: DCAOOMA 023 (visited June 20, 2000) <http://www.
ntsb.gov/Aviation/DCA/00A023.htm>, at 1.
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ing the plane to nose-dive into the Pacific.2"" Some initial reports indicated that the plane crashed eleven miles off Point
Mugu, California. 21"

However, other reports noted that the

plane crashed approximately three miles from Anacapa Island
in the Channel Islands National Marine Sanctuary.2 °9
2. JudicialDisposition
As of the date of this writing, at least one lawsuit has been
filed relating to the crash of Alaska Airlines Flight 261 and more
are certain to follow. 2

1

With the amendment of DOHSA

through section 404 of Public Law 106-181, DOHSA will not apply to Flight 261 litigation, considering either the three-mile
(Anacapa Island) or eleven-mile (California) distance between
the crash site and a territory or state of the United States. While
§ 761 (a) can no longer vest admiralty jurisdiction with a federal
court, the continued viability of Executive Jet will nonetheless invoke the admiralty jurisdiction's applicability in these cases. Executive Jet applies to litigation arising out of the crash of Flight
261, considering the international nature of the flight. Flight
261 admiralty courts, facing the need to further the constitutional uniformity of the admiralty law, will encounter difficult
choice-of-law issues arising from Congress' removal of DOHSA's
application. These admiralty courts must not be tempted to cite
the Second Circuit's decision and apply state law remedies to
cases arising out of the crash, which occurred in federal waters.
Such application is unsupported by precedent and poses constitutional concerns by undermining the admiralty law's uniformity axiom.
B.

EGYPTAIR FLIGHT 990

1. Background
EgyptAir Flight 990 crashed approximately fifty-two nautical
miles off the coast of Nantucket Island, Massachusetts on Octo207

See Statement by Chairmanjim Hall: Update on Investigation of the Crash of Alaska

Airlines Flight 261 (visited June 20, 2000) <http://www.ntsb.gov/pressrel2000/
000218.htm>.
208 SeeJennifer Anther, et al., Hope lessens for Alaska Airlines crash survivors (visited June 20, 2000) <http://www.cnn.com/2000/US/02/01/alaska.airlines.06/

index.html>.
2011See NOS Support in Alaska Airlines Flight 261 Incident Response (visited June 20,
2000) <http://www.nos.noaa.gov/news/flt261/flight261.html>.
210 See Alaska Flight 261 Crash Tiggers Suit (visited June 20, 2000) <http://
www.claimsmag.com/Issues/March00/Alaska.asp>.
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ber 31, 1999, killing all 217 people aboard.2 1 Information obtained from Flight 990's Flight Data Recorder indicate that the
plane dove from 32,800 feet to 16,400 feet in a matter of fortytwo seconds.2 12 Air Force radar then showed the Boeing 767
climb to 24,000 feet for at least twenty-nine seconds before
crashing into the Atlantic Ocean. 2 " Although the NTSB's investigation of EgyptAir Flight 990's crash is still ongoing, James
Hall, Chairman of the NTSB, stated-after the NTSB examined
the Cockpit Voice Recorder ("CVR")-that "'no sounds have
been detected [from the CVR] that would be consistent with
mechanical failures or an explosion.' "214 Rumors abound that
the NTSB, suspecting that the "uneventful flight" was internally
sabotaged by a crew member, will eventually hand the investigation over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation to launch a full
criminal probe.21
2. Judicial Disposition
The first of many EgyptAir Flight 990 lawsuits has been filed
against the airline and Boeing. 21", The suit, while not addressing
the possible cause of the crash, alleges that EgyptAir breached
its responsibility to passengers to provide adequate psychological screening of pilots when they are selected for employment.2 1 7

The complaint also implicates Boeing for alleged

negligent manufacture, maintenance, inspection, and repair of
the 767.2"18 Because Flight 990 crashed fifty-two nautical miles
off the coast of Massachusetts, 46 U.S.C. § 762(b) is clearly applicable to this lawsuit and other Flight 990 lawsuits. While
DOHSA continues to provide admiralty jurisdiction and a cause
of action for the passengers' beneficiaries, Public Law 106-181's
amendment through section 404 now allows recovery of nonpecuniary damages. This grant of nonpecuniary damages, how211

See James T. McKenna, EgyptAir FDR Data Puzzles Investigators, AvIATION

WEEK & SPACE TECH., Nov. 15, 1999, at 36.
212 See EgyptAir Flight 990 Timeline (visited June 20, 2000) <http://
www.ntsb.gov/events/EA990/timeline.htm>.
21. See id.
214 Matthew Brelis, No Bomb, Malfunction Found on EgyptAir 990, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Dec. 11, 1999, at A27.
215 See McKenna, supra note 211, at 36; see also James T. McKenna, U.S., Eyptians Split On Suicide Theory, AvIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Nov. 22, 1999, at 41.
216 See First Suit Filed in
Crash (visited June 20, 2000) <http://
www.abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/egyptair_suit991117.html>.
217 See id.
218 See id.
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ever, has limitations grounded in United States Supreme Court
precedent. Arguably, the deaths that occurred as a result of
Flight 990's crash were preceded by psychological trauma resulting from the extreme altitude vacillations of the 767. Nonetheless, litigants and courts hearing Flight 990 cases must be
mindful that damages for a decedent's pre-death pain and suffering are not recoverable pursuant to Gaudet's limitation of
"loss of society" damages.1 ' '
In practical application, Public Law 106-181's amendment of
DOHSA through section 404 raises public policy concerns. If a
passenger traveling from New York to Cairo aboard a commercial cruise ship were to die as a result of an accident in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean, DOHSA would apply in its traditional
form and prevent the recovery of nonpecuniary damages. However, the passenger's beneficiaries would be allowed nonpecuniary recovery if the accident occurred aboard an aircraft
operated by a commercial airline. By legislating as it has, Congress has determined that beneficiaries of vessel-going passengers are less valuable in the eyes of the law. If Congress believes
that beneficiaries of air crash victims should be afforded special
consideration, it should pass such legislation outside of Title 46' 22
of
the United States Code-the title that governs "Shipping." 0
However, the constitutional uniformity principles of the maritime law cannot allow the shipping laws to provide a limited, ad
hoc grant of nonpecuniary damages for beneficiaries of commercial airline accident victims.
C.

SWISSAIR FLIGHT 111

1. Background
On September 2, 1998, Swissair Flight 111, a McDonnell
Douglas MD-1I bound from New York to Geneva, Switzerland,
219 Moreover, while the beneficiaries likely suffered grief and anguish arising
from contemplating how their loved ones perished, such damages are not compensable under the amended DOHSA provisions or United States Supreme
Court precedent. Our discussion of the unavailability of damages arising from
pre-death pain and suffering and survivor's grief is consequential because some
beneficiaries of Flight 990 decedents are likely to seek these damages, as the TWA
Flight 800 plaintiffs did.
22
For example, if Congress wishes to carve out an exception for the beneficiaries of commercial airline accident victims, it should do so in an independent
and constitutionally sound legislative provision grounded in Title 49 of the
United States Code. Title 49 addresses forms of transportation other than railroad transportation, governed by Title 45, and shipping transportation, governed
by Title 46.
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crashed in Canadian waters off Peggy's Cove, Nova Scotia, killing all 229 people aboard. 2 ' While the cause of the accident is
still unknown, Canadian investigators suspect faulty wiring
sparked a fire that ultimately led to the crash.2 2 Several lawsuits
have been filed by the families of the deceased, naming Swissair,
Delta Airlines (Swissair's code-sharing partner for Flight 111),
Boeing (acquirer of McDonnell Douglas), DuPont (manufacturer of the Mylar insulation that allegedly fueled the fire), Hollingsead International (aircraft maintenance company),
Interactive Flight Technologies (manufacturer of a high-tech inflight entertainment system), and other defendants. 22 3 Against

Swissair, the plaintiffs have claimed that the airline knew of
safety hazards associated with
the insulation used to protect the
24
2
MD-11's electrical wiring.

2. Judicial Disposition
Like the TWA consolidation, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred all wrongful death cases to the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ("EDPA") for consolidated pretrial proceedings.225 On
August 5, 1999, Swissair and Boeing offered jointly to pay compensatory damages to the families of the deceased in exchange
for the families' agreement not to seek punitive damages.226
However, the families asked the EDPA to reject this settlement
offer, stating that it could prevent recovery of an estimated one
billion dollars in punitive damages. 2 7
On September 13, 1999, before the DOHSA amendments became effective, Swissair filed a motion asking the EDPA to determine whether DOHSA would apply to the case, thus eliminating
221 See Richard Dooley, Flight 111: A Year in Review, HALIFAX DAILY NEWS (Sept.

2, 1999) <http://www.hfxnews.southam.ca/Crash/swissair312.html>.
222 See Richard Dooley, Swissair Probe Seeks Mylar Ban, HALIFAX DAILY NEWS

(Aug. 12, 1999) <http://www.hfxnews.southam.ca/Crash/swissair296.html>.
223 See Richard Dooley, Swissair Families Sue Du Pont, HALIFAX DAILY NEWS (Aug.
17, 1999) <http://ww.hfxnews.southan.ca/Crash/swissair300.htnl>.
224 See Swissair Knew Risk, Says Suit, HALIFAX DAILY NEWS (Sept. 22, 1999)

<http://wvw.hfxnews.southain.ca/Crash/swissair328.html>.
225 See Larry Fish, Companies Offer to Pay Damages in Deadly Swissair Crash, Pi-ILADIJLPI-IIA INQUIRER, Aug. 6, 1999, at A16.
226, See

id.

See Swissair Argues Against Damages, HALIFAX DAILY NEWS (Sept. 14, 999)
<http://wwvw.hfxnews.southam.ca/Crash/swissair326.html>. The families also argued that acceptance of the settlement Would prevent them from learning the
full extent of Swissair's and Boeing's alleged misconduct. See id.
227
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the plaintiffs' claims for nonpecuniary damages. 22 Historically,
courts have held that DOHSA applied in foreign territorial waters because the territorial waters of foreign nations are considered part of the "high seas" for purposes of applying DOHSA. 22 9'
If the EDPA rules that DOHSA does apply, Public Law 106-181's
amendment through section 404 will allow recovery of nonpecuniary damages.23 ) However, § 762, as amended by section 404 of
Public Law 106-181, will expressly disallow recovery of punitive
damages in Swissair cases,
unless such damages are available
231
under some other law.

id.
See Howard v. Crystal Cruises, Inc., 41 F.3d 527, 529 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting 2 ELLEN M. FLYNN, ET AL., BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY at 7-11 (7th ed. 1993))
(providing that "'the term 'High Seas' within the meaning of DOHSA is not limited to international waters, but includes the territorial waters of a foreign nation
as long as they are more than a marine league away from any United States
shore"'); Sanchez v. Loffland Bros. Co., 626 F.2d 1228, 1229 n.4 (5th Cir. 1980)
(providing that DOHSA has been applied "when the cause of action arises
outside of United States territorial waters and within the territorial waters of a
foreign country"); Moyer v. Rederi, 645 F. Supp. 620, 623 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (providing that "maritime incidents occurring within the territorial waters of foreign
states fall within the ambit of DOHSA").
231) These nonpecuniary damages will be limited by Gaudet, as discussed above.
See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
231 If the EDPA rules that DOHSA does apply to the Swissair litigation, an interesting question arises through consideration of 46 U.S.C. § 764's effect on the
litigation-i.e., whether or not Canadian/Nova Scotian law will be allowed to supplement DOHSA. While an extensive review of this issue is beyond the scope of
this article, we will briefly discuss § 764's probable application. As provided
above, the United States Supreme Court in Zicherman held that DOHSA provides
the federal substantive law for deaths occurring on the "high seas." See
Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 229 (1995). While the portion
of the decision confirming the tnavailability of nonpecuniary damages under
DOHSA has been legislatively overruled by section 404 of Public Law 106-181,
Zichernan's holding that DOHSA provides the substantive United States law for
deaths occurring on the high seas arguably remains valid. Therefore, the application of foreign law would appear to be precluded by Zicherman. However, federal courts are split on the effect § 764 has on DOHSA litigation where a foreign
law also grants a right of action in any given lawsuit. See Dooley v. Korean Air
Lines Co., 117 F.3d 1477, 1483 (D.C. Cir. 1997), affd 524 U.S. 116 (1998). Some
courts have held that § 764 allows plaintiffs to use an action under DOHSA to
assert claims recognized under foreign law. See id. (citing Heath v. American Sail
Training Ass'n, 644 F. Supp. 1459, 1467 (D.R.I. 1986)); Noel v. Linea Aeropostal
Venezolana, 260 F. Stipp. 1002, 1004-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Fernandez v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 156 F. Supp. 94, 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); lafrate v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique, 106 F. Supp. 619, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1952)). Other courts
have held that §§ 761 and 764 are mutually exclusive and that plaintiffs therefore
may not simultaneously advance claims tinder both United States and foreign
law. See Dooley, 117 F.3d at 1483 (citing In re Air Crash Disaster Near Bombay,
India on Jan. 1, 1978, 531 F. Supp. 1175, 1185-88 (W.D. Wash. 1982)); Bergeron
'228

229

See
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The operation of the amended § 762 in the Swissair litigation
will undermine the uniformity principle of the maritime law in
the same manner as the EgyptAir litigation, discussed above.
Had Flight 111 decedents met their death utilizing an alternative method of transportation to Europe-i.e., a commercial
cruise vessel-the recovery afforded their beneficiaries would
not be the same. If Congress wishes to make this distinction, it
should do so in an area outside of the federal shipping laws
found in Title 46 of the United States Code.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is time for Congress to remove DOHSA's haphazard application to cases resulting from commercial airline accidents occurring on the high seas. Certainly, Congress' amendment of
DOHSA through section 404 of Public Law 106-181 has revealed
a national interest in favor of beneficiaries' recovery for the
deaths of their family members in a high seas commercial airline accident. Whether or not this national interest is justified, it
should not be conveyed through ad hoc legislation which subverts the constitutionally-based uniformity principle of the admiralty law.
v. Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij, N.V., 188 F. Supp. 594, 596-97 (S.D.N.Y.
1960); The Vulcania, 41 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1941)). In Dooley, the Third Circuit refused to allow the plaintiffs "to pick and choose among provisions of U.S.
and [foreign] law in order to assemble the most favorable package of rights
against the defendant." Dooley, 117 F.3d at 1483-84. Likewise, the EDPA might
refuse to allow the Swissair plaintiffs to pick and choose between various foreign
laws as they mount their case against the defendants. Such a ruling would be
consistent with DOHSA's uniformity purpose, as it would not result in drastically
different recoveries based on which substantive foreign law happens to apply.
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